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4 I - The Court in the Community institutional system 
The European Community, founded on the Treaties of Paris and Rome, is governed 
by a quadripartite institutional system - novel in its conception, unique in its as-
signment of powers, different from all previous national and international systems, 
a Community system in letter and in spirit. 
The Commission, an independent body with executive powers and responsibility, 
ha~ 17 members chosen for their all-round capability by agreement between the 
governments of the Member States. It is responsible for monitoring the application 
of the Treaties and for the functioning and development of the common market. 
The Council - the political decision-making centre - is  a collective body with a 
legislative function; it is  respresentative of the Member States since  its members 
are  ministers  delegated  by  the various governments,  and it ensures that all  the 
Community countries play their part in the decision-making process. 
The Parliament, consisting of representatives of the peoples of Europe, designated 
indirectly for many years but finally elected by direct universal suffrage since 1979, 
exercises limited but growing supervisory powers. 
But the founding fathers went further than simply setting up these institutions. They 
also laid the foundations of a Community based on a system of  law, with a new, au-
tonomous and uniform body of law separate from and transcending national law, 
binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 
Having done this, it was then necessary to enforce the law, to see that everyone did 
not interpret and apply it in his own way and to guarantee that this common body of 
law kept its Community character and remained identical for everyone, whatever 
the circumstances. The Court of  Justice, based from the outset in Luxembourg, was 
to h.andle, as the fourth institution, the task of ensuring that the law was observed in 
the interpretation and application of the Treaties. 
5 IT - Composition and organization of the Court 
Thirteen judges and six advocates-general 
Since the accession of Spain and Portugal to the European Community in January 
1986, the Court has consisted of thirteen judges. In the words of the Treaties, the 
Court is 'assisted' by six advocates-general. 
The judges are appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member 
States, a procedure which underlines the concept that the Court is just as much a 
Community institution as  the Council, the Commission or the European Parlia-
ment. Members hold office for a renewable term of six years. 
Every three years there is a partial replacement of the Court's membership. Seven or 
six  judges  and  three  advocates-general  are  replaced  alternately.  This  ensures 
continuity of the Court's decisions, especially as most of the judges have had their 
term of office renewed at least once and sometimes twice. 
The Treaties require  judges  to be chosen  'from  persons whose  independence is 
beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications required for appointment to the 
highest judicial offices in their respective countries or who are jurisconsults of recog-
nized competence'. There is no specific nationality requirement, but at the present 
time the Court has one judge from each Member State. 
Since, however, the number of judges is  not the same as the number of Member 
States, the 13th post of judge is assigned at the discretion of the governments. Up to 
now, that judge has been chosen from the nationals of the large Member States. 
Because of the freedom of choice available, the members of the Court have come 
from widely differing professional backgrounds. Judges, politicians, diplomats, aca-
demics, advocates and senior officials have all  brought with them their particular 
experience and thus made their own contribution to the authority of the Court's de-
cisions. 
The independence of the judges is guaranteed by their statute and is expressed in cer-
tain fundamental rules of procedure: their deliberations are secret; the judges are ir-
7 removable; they are immume from  legal  proceedings; and their immunity can be 
waived only by a unanimous decision of the Court itself, the person concerned ob-
viously being excluded from the deliberations. 
The judges select one of their number to be President for a renewable term of three 
years. The President directs the work of the Court and, in keeping with the criteria 
laid down by the Court, assigns cases to the Chambers when the application is re-
ceived, appoints a judge-rapporteur for each case and sets the schedule for the var-
ious stages of the procedure and the dates of hearings and deliberations. He also 
gives  judgment in summary proceedings on applications for provisional measures, 
though the decision may be referred to the full  Court. 
The advocates-genedtl are appointed on the same terms and have to satisfy the same 
criteria with respect to independence and training as the judges. Nationality is im-
material. In practice, until recently the advocates-general were all nationals of the 
larger Community countries, but lately two posts of advocate-general have gone to a 
national of one of the smaller Member States. 
The First Advocate-General, appointed by the Court for one year, assigns cases to 
individual advocates-general as soon as the Judge-Rapporteur has been appointed 
by the President. 
The duties of the advocates-general should not be confused with those of a public 
prosecutor or similar kind of functionary such as the 'parquet' in a French court; ra-
ther, this is the task of the Commission. The advocates-general do not represent the 
Communities and cannot initiate proceedings themselves. According to the Treaties 
the function of the advocates-general is, 'acting with complete impartiality and inde-
pendence, to make, in open court, reasoned submissions on cases brought before the 
Court, in order to assist the Court in the performance of the tasks assigned to it'. 
At a separate hearing some weeks after the lawyers have addressed the Court, the 
advocate-general comments on the various aspects of the case, weighs up the provi-
sions  of Community law, compares the case  in  point with previous rulings  and 
proposes a legal solution to the dispute. He does not participate in the Court's de-
liberations. 
Each judge and advocate-general is assisted by two law clerks - qualified lawyers 
who carry out research  on questions both of procedure and of substantive law, 
study the  cases  and prepare procedural documents  on cases  pending before  the 
Court. The judges and advocates-general are free to choose their own law clerks. 
8 Plenary sessions and Chambers 
The Court normally  sits  in  plenary  session.  It  must  do  so  when  hearing  cases 
brought before it by a Member State or by one of the Community institutions, or 
when a Member State or a Community institution, being a party to a case or having 
made written observations on a request for a preliminary ruling, has request that the 
case be  heard by the full  Court. Its deliberations are only valid if there is  an odd 
number of judges, the quorum being seven. 
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9 However, the Treaties and its own rules of procedure allow it to set up Chambers 
within the Court: there are currently four Chambers composed of three judges and 
two Chambers composed of six judges. No Chamber specializes in any particular 
subject. The Presidents of the Chambers are appointed annually by the Court, on 
the basis of an annual rotation. 
Unlike cases brought by a Member State or an institution, the Court may refer to 
Chambers any request for a preliminary ruling, or any action brought by persons or 
firms, where, in the words of the rules of procedure, the difficulty or the importance 
of the case or particular circumstances are not such as to require that the Court de-
cide it in plenary session. 
The decision to assign a case is taken by the Court at the end of the written proce-
dure upon consideration of the preliminary report presented by the Judge-Rappor-
teur and after the advocate-general has been heard. 
Actions brought by officials or other employees of the institutions against the in-
stitutions are assigned to the Chambers in rotation and irrespective of the nature of 
the case, except where cases are linked. 
At any stage in the proceedings the Chamber may refer to the Court a case assigned 
to or devolving upon it, if it considers that the case raises points of law requiring de-
cision by the full Court. 
The Registry and administration 
The judges and advocates-general jointly appoint the Registrar of the Court, and 
one or more Assistant-Registrars, for a renewable term of six years. The Registrar 
acts  as  a  kind  of secretary-general  to  the  Court,  being  responsible  for  the  ac-
ceptance, transmission and custody of all documents and notifications. All plead-
ings are entered in his register and he is responsible for drawing up the minutes of 
each hearing. The Registrar is  also responsible for Court administration: he is  in 
charge of the budget and supervises the management and operation of each depart-
ment. 
The Court has its own language service, whose staff have to be proficient in several 
Community languages and have a legal  background as  the written pleadings, the 
opinions  of  the  advocates-general  and  the  Court's  rulings  must  be  properly 
translated into the ten procedural languages. A special department provides inter-
preters for hearings. 
10 The Court has a library and documentation service covering national and Commun-
ity legislation, case-law and legal literature, linked to the Community data-process-
ing system {Celex); specialists can obtain access by this means to the whole of the 
Court's case-law. 
A court of  first instance 
By virtue of the 'Single European Act' signed on 17 February 1986 in Luxembourg, 
at the request of the Court of Justice and after consulting the Commission and the 
European Parliament, the Council may, acting unanimously, attach to the Court of 
Justice a court of first instance, with jurisdiction to hear certain classes of action 
brought by natural or legal persons. Such a court would, in particular, be competent 
to hear actions brought by officials  of the European Communities,  competition 
cases and actions for damages. It would not be  competent to hear actions brought 
by Member States, or to deal with questions referred for preliminary rulings. Its de-
cisions would be subject to appeal to the Court of Justice on points of law. 
The Council is to determine the composition of the court of first instance. Its mem-
bers are to be chosen from persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who 
possess the ability required for appointment to judicial office. Like the judges of the 
Court of  Justice, they are to be appointed by common accord of  the Governments of 
the Member States for a term of six years. The membership is  to be partially re-
newed every three years, retiring members being eligible for reappointment. 
11 m  - The Court's powers 
The Court ensures the observance of  Community law 
Each of the Treaties establishing the European Communities uses the same broad 
terms to define the specific responsibilities of the Court of  Justice, which is to 'ensure 
that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed'. 
The implication  of this  rather laconic formula  is  that the  Court interprets and 
applies the whole corpus of Community law from the basic Treaties to the various 
regulations, directives and decisions issued by the Council and the Commission. Its 
task is not to apply national law, but it may sometimes have to rule on the conform-
ity of national law with Community law in an individual case concerning the failure 
of a Member State to fulfil an obligation. It may also occur, though this is very rare, 
that the Court is asked to apply and interpret national law in disputes involving con-
tracts to which the Community is a party. 
Although its jurisdiction is principally concerned with Community law, the Court is 
not cut off from national law since it draws its inspiration from the legal traditions 
that are common to the Member States and ensures respect both for the general 
principles of law and for fundamental human rights insofar as they have been incor-
porated into the Community legal order. 
The supreme judicial authority 
The Court is the Community's supreme judicial authority; there is no appeal against 
its rulings. And yet it is not the only body which enforces Community law. 
National courts at all levels likewise have jurisdictions to apply and interpret Com-
munity law, which, to use words taken from a number of rulings, 'produce direct ef-
fects and create individual rights which national courts must protect'. Requests for 
preliminary rulings form the required link between the Court of Justice and the na-
tional courts, which may, and in some cases must, ask the Court to interpret Com-
munity law or to rule on the validity of acts by the Council and the Commission. 
13 The various forms of  action 
Recourse to the Court is simple, although there are a variety of ways in which it may 
be made. A distinction may be drawn between proceedings against a Member State 
for failure to fulfil an obligation, proceedings for annulment, proceedings against an 
institution for failure to act, proceedings to establish liability and references for a 
preliminary ruling. 
Proceedings for failure to fulfil an obligation 
In the first place it is for the Commission, as guardian of the Treaties and of the deci-
sions taken by the institutions, to initiate proceedings for failure to fulfil an obliga-
tion. If it considers that any part of the administration of a Member State has not 
honoured a Community obligation, it asks the Member State to make it comments 
and then issues a reasoned opinion. If the State does not act on the opinion within 
the time allowed in the opinion, it may be taken to the Court. 
After notifying the Commission, a Member State may also initiate this procedure. 
Again, the Commission asks the Member State against which the breach is alleged to 
present its comments and then issues a reasoned opinion. If the Commission does 
not produce the opinion within three  months  from  the  date of the request,  the 
matter may be referred directly to the Court. In practice, the Member States have 
tended to prefer settling their disputes within the Council or turning to the Commis-
sion. It was not until1978 that Member States brought cases for failure to fulfil an 
obligation. In one case, a Member State complained that another Member State was 
impeding the free  movement of sheepmeat. This action was withdrawn when the 
Commission brought an action as a result of which the national regulations were 
declared to be contrary to the Treaty. In  the second case, one Member State re-
quested the Court to find that another had not complied with its Treaty obligations 
by  taking  certain  restrictive  measures  concerning  fisheries.  The accusation  was 
upheld by a judgment of the Court. 
If  the Court agrees that the case is well-founded, it declares that an obligation has 
not been fulfilled. All the authorities of the Member State concerned are required to 
take the necessary measures to comply with the Court's judgment in their respective 
areas of competence. 
If  the Court finds that certain legislation of a Member State is incompatible with the 
Treaty, the authorities involved in the exercise of the legislative power must amend 
the legislation so as to bring it into conformity with the requirements of Community 
law. 
14 The courts of the State concerned also have the obligation of ensuring in the course 
of their work that the judgment is observed. 
If a State does not comply with the ruling, new proceedings may be brought for a 
declaration by the Court that the obligations arising from its first decision have not 
been complied with. 
The Treaty does not provide any sanction where a Member State fails to give effect 
to a judgment. The effectiveness of Community law can, however, be ensured by 
national courts and by means of references for preliminary rulings. 
In general, the Member States have complied, sooner or later, with the Court's judg-
ment. In a limited number of cases the Court, in an action brought by the Commis-
sion, has had to deliver a second judgment, since the Member States concerned have 
not complied with the first one within a reasonable time. On two occasions, how-
ever, delay has ensued while the countries concerned tried to get Comunity rules in-
troduced or changed by  political means. If such  behaviour became the norm, it 
would threaten the very foundations of the Community. 
Up to the end of 1985, a total of 412 actions for failure to fulfil an obligation had 
been brought. 
More than 100 were removed from  the register because the Member States had 
brought the infringement to an end during the proceedings before the Court; the 
Commission thereupon discontinued its action. At the same date, the Court had 
given 165 judgments. The frequency of such cases is still rising sharply. Neverthe-
less, the deterrent and preventative effect of the procedure before the Commission is 
considerable, most cases being settled at the preliminary stage. Almost all Member 
States have had actions of this type brought against them, although some figure 
more frequently than others. The subjects of the actions range from customs duties 
and charges having equivalent effect to refusal to adopt the measures imposed by 
Community law in the field of trade, health, social welfare, etc. 
Proceedings for annulment 
Proceedings for annulment are directed against binding Community acts, be they of 
a  gen~ral nature (regulations and directives) or decisions addressed to individuals 
taken by the Council and the Commission. Because opinions and recommendations 
do not have binding force, proceedings may not be  brought in respect of them. In 
the words of the Treaty, grounds for  annulment include lack of competence, in-
fringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or 
of any rules of law relating to their application and missue of powers. 
15 If  the Court regards the action as well-founded, it declares the act in question void 
and of no effect, and the act then ceases to have any legal force as from the date 
when it originally to'ok effect. Nevertheless, in the case of a regulation, the Court 
may confirm the validity of certain provisions, indicating, if it thinks it necessary, 
which of the effects of the regulation declared void must be considered definitive. 
On a number of occasions, in the interest of legal certainty, the Court has main-
tained the past effects of a regulation it has declared void. 
Proceedings for annulment are a way of reviewing the legality under the Treaties of 
Community  acts  and of Commission  decisions  and regulations  and  of settling 
conflicts between the institutions over their respective powers under the Treaties. 
The Member States and the Community institutions can seek the annulment of any 
binding act of the institutions, including those which, like regulations and direc-
tives, are of general application. 
Only rarely have the Member States brought an action against the Council. Italy 
sought the annulment of regulations relating to the application of the competition 
rules and to the calculation of a premium for starch produced from potatoes; both 
actions were dismissed. In 1986 the United Kingdom brought an action for the an-
nulment of a  directive prohibiting the use  of certain hormones in  stockfarming, 
contending that the directive was illegal, having been adopted by a majority and not 
unanimously, that essential procedural requirements had been infringed and that the 
measures were unjusutified. It also sought the annulment of a directive laying down 
minimum standards for the protection of laying hens kept in battery cages, on the 
ground of a  procedural  defect.  About the same  time,  Spain  brought an  action 
against the general rules applying the complementary mechanism governing, for a 
transitional period, trade in  certain agricultural products between Spain and the 
other Community Member States. Greece sought the annulment of a decision clos-
ing the anti-dumping procedure concerning importations of natural magnesite. 
The Member States have brought about 40 actions against Commission decisions, 
dealing inter alia with free movement of goods, restructuring of industry, the lawful-
ness of national aids, transport, and the settlement of amounts due under the agri-
cultural fund. 
In 1981, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg started proceedings for the annulment of 
a resolution of the European Parliament on the seat of the institutions of the Eu-
ropean Community. On the substance of the case, the Court held that it was ex-
clusively for the governments of the Member States to fix  the seat, though provi-
sional decisions on the places of work must respect Parliament's right to decide how 
to organize its proceedings and must not prevent it from operating properly. Parlia-
ment, on the other hand, under its powers to decide how to organize itself, had the 
right to take the necessary steps to ensure that it could function properly and that 
16 there was nothing to disrupt its  procedures. It thus had the right to hold all  its 
plenary sessions  in  Strasbourg and to hold committee meetings  and meetings of 
political groups in Brussels. It could maintain the infrastructure necessary to carry 
out the tasks conferred on it by the Treaties elsewhere than in Luxembourg, where 
its secretariat is. The Court held, however, that staff transfers must not exceed cer-
tain limits, since any de jure and de facto decision to transfer in whole or in part the 
secretariat or departments of it would contravene the decision on the provisional 
location of certain institutions adopted by the governments of the Member States at 
the same time as the Merger Treaty. 
In  1983 Parliament adopted a resolution intended  to divide the staff of its secreta-
riat between Strasbourg and Brussels. Luxembourg brought a fresh action, and the 
Court held - contrary to Parliament's contention - that the resolution was a pre-
cise and concrete decision, capable of producing legal effects. On the point of sub-
stance, the Court held that Parliament had clearly exceeded its powers and the limits 
defined in the previous judgment as regards transfers of staff.  · 
While the Council has never brought an action for annulment against the Commis-
sion, the latter has on several occasions brought actions to settle disputes with the 
Council. In 1971 it asked the Court to decide whether, at a specific date, the com-
petence  to  negotiate  and  conclude  the  European  Road  Transport  Agreement 
(ER  T A)  lay with the  Community or with the Member States.  The principle on 
which the case was brought was held to be well-founded, and the Commission's 
view was accepted in general terms, but the Court held that in the particular case 
there were no grounds for annulment. In  1983 the Court clarified the apportion-
ment and management of a tariff quota under the Lome Convention. On three occa-
sions it has had to consider the annual adjustment of officials' salaries, decided upon 
by the Council. 
The European Parliament once considered taking to the Court its dispute with the 
Council over their respective budgetary powers. It eventually decided not to do so, 
because  the  Council  came  round  to  Parliament's  way  of thinking.  In  1982 the 
Council  in  turn brought a  similar type of case  against Parliament, but this was 
settled by a political compromise. At the end of 1985 a fresh dispute arose between 
the Council and Parliament on the question of budgetary powers. Parliament had, 
on its final reading, increased the budget beyond the level the Council considered 
proper. The Council and five Member States asked the Court to declare the budget 
void, but only partially, so as to safeguard the result of the Council's second read-
ing. The Court expressly confirmed that the acts of Parliament, like the budget, that 
are intended to create legal effects in relation to third parties, may form the subject 
of an action for annulment. It told the Council and Parliament that they must reach 
an agreement on the budget. The Court took the view that its own task was simply 
to ensure that the institutions constjtuting the  budgetary authority observed the 
limits of their powers, and refused to become involved in the negotiating process 
17 between the Council and Parliament. It therefore annulled only the act of the Presi-
dent of Parliament declaring the budget finally adopted; this meant that the whole 
budget disappeared. 
A private individual may bring an action for annulment of a decision addressed to 
him, or a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or of a decision ad-
dressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to him. Such actions 
must be commenced within two months. 
On this basis the Court may be called upon to rule on decisions the Commission has 
taken and penalties it has imposed on firms that have failed to observe the principle 
of free  competition or have abused their dominant position on the European mar-
ket. The Court, in the exercise of its power of review, may declare such decisions 
void, or reduce or increase fines and penalty payments. 
Thus the Court partially annulled, on the ground that they were not well-founded, 
the Commission's decisions imposing heavy fines on almost all the sugar producers 
in the Community's six founder Member States; the firms had been accused of divid-
ing the European market between them.  The essential  argument for altering the 
Commission's decision and reducing the fines was that the common organization of 
the market left very little room for free competition. In  other cases the Court has 
fully confirmed the Commission's decisions. 
The system of production and delivery quotas introduced as a means of coping with 
the steel crisis has resulted in many firms bringing actions complaining that they re-
garded their quotas as insufficient, or appealing against fines imposed on them for 
failing  to observe their quotas.  To a very  large extent the Court has upheld the 
system. Only in exceptional cases have the fines,  an essential corollary of the dis-
cipline  involved,  been  reduced,  on  the  ground  that  the  Commission  had  not 
evaluated the circumstances correctly. 
Private individuals may, in an action against a decision addressed to them personally 
or a penalty imposed on them, plead the illegality of the regulation on which the of-
fending  decision was based.  Similarly,  in  an action for  non-contractual liability, 
they may chaim that an act-even a regulation- is illegal if (i) they believe that the 
damage they have suffered arises from the application of that illegal act, and (ii) the 
Community can be held liable for the illegal act of the relevant institution. 
To give but one example, the main producers of isoglucose, a liquid sweetener made 
from maize, brought an action for the annulment of the agricultural regulations re-
ducing the production refunds on products used for manufacturing this sweetener. 
Their action was dismissed as inadmissible: the Court held that a regulation reduc-
ing or even abolishing a production refund for a full marketing year on a product 
manufactured from cereals was by its nature a measure having a general effect. It ap-
18 The Court of  Justice in session. It comprises thirteen judges and six advocates-general. 
plied to situations defined in  objective terms and its legal effects on persons were 
considered in a general and abstract manner. The firms then aked for a preliminary 
ruling. This time the Court accepted their submission to the extent that, although it 
considered the reduction in production refunds to be valid, it held a new tax on the 
production of isoglucosoe to be illegal. Some time later, they secured the annulment 
of another regulation concerning isoglucose, this time because the Council, by act-
ing before Parliament had delivered its opinion, had infringed one of the essential 
Treaty provisions concerning the allocation of powers. 
Failure to act 
Proceedings for failure to act provide a means of penalizing inactivity on the part of 
the Council or the Commission. Should the Council or the Commission infringe the 
Treaty by failing to act, the Member States and the other institutions of the Com-
munity may bring an action before the Court of Justice to have the infringement 
established. 
Such  actions are admissible only if the institution in  question has previously been 
called upon to act. If the institution has not acted within two months of being in-
vited to do so, an action may be brought within a further period of two months. 
19 Proceedings for failure to act have rarely been successful. At the beginning of the 
1970s, Parliament contemplated bringing such an action against the Council for 
failure to take a decision on the direct election of Parliament by universal suffrage. 
An  opinion prepared by a  panel of university professors, however, came to the 
conclusion that, even if the action were declared admissible, it was not certain that 
the Court would find against the Council since the Treaties did not set a precise date 
for direct elections. The decision taken by the Heads of State or Government at the 
1974 Paris Summit finally resolved the problem. 
In September 1982 the European Parliament resolved to bring proceedings of this 
type against the Council on the ground that the latter had failed to lay the founda-
tions for a common transport policy. Parliament was partially successful. The Court 
declared the action admissible. It went on to hold that the Council had infringed the 
Treaty by failing to ensure freedom to provide services in international transport 
and to lay down conditions for the admission of non-resident carriers to national 
transport in a Member State. On the other hand, the Court declined to take cogni-
zance, as  Parliament requested, of the absence of a common transport policy as 
such, since the Treaty did not define that policy with sufficient clarity to enable the 
Court to pronounce on it. It did, however, recommend the Council to work conti-
nuously towards the progressive attainment of a common transport policy. 
The institutions have considerable scope for taking proceedings for failure to act, 
but such cases can also be brought under identical conditions by private individuals 
or firms, who can complain that a Community institution has failed to take a bind-
ing decision (i.e. one other than a recommendation or opinion) concerning them. 
Admissibility is subject to the same conditions as those which apply to actions for 
annulment - the action not taken must have been of direct and personal concern to 
the applicant.  Thus, private individuals cannot bring such  an action against the 
omission of acts of a legislative nature. 
Private individuals and firms have brought a number of such cases: the vast majority 
have been declared inadmissible and the others have failed; only two have been held 
to be well-founded. 
Actions to establish liability 
The Community may incur civil liability for damage caused by its institutions or ser-
vants in the performance of their duties in accordance with the general principles 
common to the laws of the Member States. The Treaties confer on the Court of  Jus-
tice the exclusive jurisdiction to order the Community to pay damages because of its 
actions or its legislative acts on the principle of non-contractual liability. The Court 
decides the basis on which liability is to be determined, whether the damage is due to 
Community action, the amount of damage caused and the sum to be paid in com-
20 pensation. By contrast, the Community's contractual liability is subject to the gen· 
era! law of the Member States and to the jurisdiction of their courts. 
Private persons have considerable scope  for  bringing actions for  non-contractual 
liability.  The  common  agricultural  policy  with  its  marketing  regulations  and 
systems of grants, refunds, levies and monetary compensatory amounts has given 
rise to voluminous litigation. So far the Court has been reluctant to find such cases, 
when they challenge a Community regulation, admissible. It has awarded damages 
only in exceptional cases, where it has been proved that the damage was due to a 
sufficiently flagrant infringement of a superior rule of law intended to protect the 
interests of private parties. For this purpose several conditions must be satisfied: the 
rule in question must be fundamental to the Community legal order; it must confer 
'subjective rights' on private parties, and the applicant must be among those it is in-
tended to protect; the infringement of the rule must be manifest; the damage must be 
suffered by a limited and clearly defined group of traders, and it must lie beyond the 
limits of the risks inherent in the kind of business concerned. 
The powdered milk case is one of the better-known examples. To reduce the surplus 
of powdered milk, the Commission and the Council obliged the food industry to 
add powdered milk to animal feed in certain circumstances, mainly connected with 
the marketing of soya. A number of users felt that the Commission was imposing a 
disproportionate burden. They simultaneously began proceedings for damages both 
in  the Court of Justice and in the appropriate national courts, which in their turn 
asked for a preliminary ruling on the legality of the system. The Court ruled that the 
powdered milk regulations were invalid because the obligation to buy at a dispro-
portionately high price spread the burden unfairly over the different sectors of ag· 
riculture and was not a proper way of reducing the surpluses.  But there is  a dif-
ference between being legally in the right and being entitled to compensation. In a 
second judgment, the Court held that, where the question involves legislative pow· 
ers allowing a considerable margin of discretion, as was necessarily so in the case of 
the common agricultural policy, the Community was only liable in damages where 
the relevant body had manifestly and seriously exceeded its powers. It did not con· 
sider this to be so in the powdered milk case. 
In the isoglucose case, although the Court annulled the regulation imposing a tax on 
this liquid sweetener, it held that the Community had not incurred non-contractual 
liability. By  contrast, in the quellmehl case the Court considered that, in the cir-
cumstances, the breach of Community law was sufficiently serious to warrant the 
award of damages; the damage suffered was held to be equivalent to the refunds that 
had not been paid. 
A former employee of a Swiss multinational company, Stanley George Adams, was 
awarded partial compensation for damage he had suffered. He had given the Com· 
mission documents and other information'  on certain anti-competitive practices on 
21 the part of his employer, and had then left Switzerland. The company was fined for 
abuse of a dominant position. The company succeeded in identifying the source of 
the Commission's information, partly by  reference to the documents produced by 
the Commission during the examination of the case. The former employee returned 
to Switzerland, and was found guilty by the Swiss courts of industrial espionage. 
The Court of  Justice held that the Commission was under a duty to preserve the con-
fidential character of the information and the employee's identity, and that it had 
not taken all necessary steps to protect him from prosecution. The Court added that 
the  employee  himself  had  not  shown  all  the  prudence  necessary  in  the  cir-
cumstances. 
Cases involving staff 
The Court rules on all disputes between the Community and its staff in accordance 
with the provisions of the Staff Regulations. In this context it rules on the legality of 
the acts of the institutions in their capacity as  employers. It annuls any decisions 
contrary to the Staff Regulations or the regulations  implementing them.  It  may 
award damages or pecuniary compensation. 
Requests for preliminary rulings 
The Court is, by its very nature, the supreme guardian of Community law. But it is 
not the only court that has the power to apply and interpret this body of law that is 
common to all the Member States.  There is  a  mass of provisions in the Treaties 
themselves and in secondary legislation that is directly and immediatly applicable in 
the legal systems of all the Member States. They confer individual rights on nation-
als of Members States. Private individuals may invoke them in their national courts 
both in relation to other individuals and in relation to the national authorities. The 
courts in each Member State have thus become Community courts. 
To avoid differing and even conflicting interpretations, the Treaties introduced a 
system of preliminary rulings, which, without creating any hierarchical relation-
ships, has institutionalized a fruitful cooperation between the Court of Justice and 
national courts. 
The Treaty distinguishes between two kinds of preliminary rulings: 
(i)  rulings on interpretation, i.e. on the content and scope of the various treaties 
and the acts of the institutions, and 
(ii)  rulings on the validity of the acts of the Community institutions. 
The term  'treaty' covers the whole of its provisions,  including the annexes  and 
amendments, and the various treaties of accession. The acts of the institutions are 
22 mainly regulations, directives and decisions. International treaties concluded by the 
Community with non-member countries or international organizations also form an 
integral part of the Community legal order. 
Preliminary rulings may be given only on Community law, not on national law. Nor 
can a ruling be given on the compatibility of national law with Community law. 
When confronted with such questions, the Court of  Justice has always restricted it-
self to indicating how the Community law applicable to the case is to be interpreted, 
leaving it to the national court to decide for itself the question of compatibility. 
Where a national court from which appeals may be made (a court of first instance or 
even of appeal) finds there is a problem regarding the interpretation of the Treaties 
or of measures taken by the institutions, or some question arises as to the validity of 
these measures, it may apply to the Court in Luxembourg for a preliminary ruling if 
it considers that it needs to do so in order to give judgment. 
When a problem or question of this type arises in a national court (Constitutional 
Court, Court of Cassation, Council of State, Supreme Court, House of Lords), 
against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court is 
obliged by the Treaty to refer the matter to the Court of justice. 
In its judgment in the Cilfit case, the Court defined the extent and limits of the ob-
ligation on courts of final instance to request preliminary rulings. The Italian Court 
of Cassation had asked whether the fact that a question asked in a higher court did 
not give rise to any reasonable doubt released that court from its obligation to seek a 
preliminary ruling. The Court reiterated the purpose of the preliminary ruling and 
stated that national courts did, not need to refer questions if: 
(i)  the question raised was irrelevant, as, for instance, if it could have no possible 
influence on the outcome of the dispute; 
(ii)  the Community rule had already been interpreted by the Court, whatever the 
circumstances leading to this ruling and wihout the matters in dispute neces-
sarily being absolutely identical; 
(iii) there was no reasonable doubt about how the question should be answered. Be-
fore reaching this conclusion, the national court had to be certain that courts in 
other Member States and the Court of justice itself would agree and its conclu-
sion had to take account of the characteristics of Community law and the spe-
cial difficulties attached to its interpretation. It should also take into account the 
fact  that Community legislation  is  drafted in  several, equally authentic, lan-
guage versions, that Community law has its own terminology and that legal 
concepts do not necessarily have the same meaning in Community law as they 
do in the various national legal systems. Finally, every provision of Community 
law must be seen in its context and interpreted in the light of the whole corpus 
of Community law, its purpose and the state of its  development at the date 
when the provision in question was to be applied. 
23 Naturally, in all  these cases,  the national courts remain completely free  to refer 
questions to the Court if they consider this necessary, and at any stage of the proce-
dure they consider appropriate. The parties may suggest to the judge that he makes 
use of the preliminary ruling procedure, but they have no means, apart from inter-
nal appeal procedures, of securing such a reference. Nevertheless, if a court of last 
instance refused to ask for a ruling, proceedings could be brought against the State 
concerned for failure to fulfil an obligation. 
Preliminary rulings may be applied for only by a national court or tribunal. The na-
tional court alone decides, in complete independence, whether to refer a preliminary 
question and, if so, what its content should be. It may do so even if the parties have 
raised no question of Community law, and even if they are opposed to such a ref-
erence. The national court alone, as the only tribunal with direct knowledge of the 
facts of the case and the arguments of the parties, evaluates them and determines the 
legal  background against which its  request for interpretation should be set.  The 
question must concern a matter within the jurisdiction of the Court of  Justice, that 
is to say, it must deal with the interpretation, or examination of the validity of Com-
munity law. the Court is obliged to reply to any question raised within the limits of 
its own jurisdiction. If questions are incorrectly formulated, or relate to matters 
outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, it extracts from  all  the material 
provided by the national court the points of Community law requiring interpreta-
tion or, as the case may be, an examination of their validity. Only the national court 
may, if it thinks it necessary, withdraw a question once it has been referred to the 
Court. 
Opinions vary on the authority enjoyed by preliminary rulings and particularly on 
whether they have general effect or are binding only on the parties concerned. 
However, three points seem to have been accepted regarding references for inter-
pretation: 
(i)  the interpretation given by the Court is  binding on the court that requested it, 
and on any other court in the Member State concerned which may have to de-
cide the same case; there is nothing to prevent it from referring a further ques-
tion it if requires further clarification; 
(ii)  the interpretation serves as a basis for applying the relevant law in any subse-
quent case and other courts may invoke it without further reference to the Court 
of Justice; 
(iii) a court may always ask the Court of  Justice for a new interpretation. 
As regards judgments given in response to requests for a preliminary ruling to assess 
validity, the general view is that if the Court declares a Community provision invalid 
the ruling is universally applicable: it is binding on all the courts or tribunals of the 
Member States, even if the judgment in  question is  not directly binding on them. 
24 Whoever  enacted  the  provJSlon  (Council  or Commission)  must  withdraw it  or 
amend it in accordance with the Court's decision. But when the Court declares that 
its scrutiny has not disclosed any factors which might deprive the relevant provision 
of its validity, this declaration has only a limited application and does not constitute 
full confirmation that the measure is valid. It may be invalid for reasons other than 
those already examined. 
In the context of this procedure, the Court gives a 'ruling'. It interprets Community 
law and determines the legal situation in terms of that law. It does not determine the 
outcome of the case, which is a matter for the national court, applying Community 
law. 
A particularly valuable collaboration, in the interest of a uniform application and 
interpretation of Community law, has thus been established between the Court of 
Justice and the national courts. It is the most far-reaching and the most intimate col-
laboration ever achieved between the judiciary of different nations. 
The procedure has steadily gained importance so that now it accounts for the largest 
number of cases before the Court. This demonstrates both the extension of the field 
covered by Community law and its penetration into the legal order of the Member 
States. There was only one reference in 1961; there were 40 in 1972, 75 in 1976, 
and over 100 each year since 1978. The peak was reached in 1985 with 139 cases. 
Between 1958 and the end of December 1985, 1 444 cases were brought before the 
Court in  the form of requests for preliminary rulings; the Court has given 1 201 
rulings, 166 cases are pending and no ruling was given in 77 of them. 
The common agricultural policy, with its numerous regulations, has produced the 
largest crop of  references, followed by the problems arising from the free movement 
of goods, the custums union, social questions and the free  movement of workers. 
On the whole the process of securing uniform application and interpretation of 
Community law has been reasonably smooth, although some courts of last instance 
have disregarded their obligation to make references, or have relied on the 'acte clair' 
theory to deny the existence of such an obligation. The main points of difference 
between the Court of Justice and national courts concern fundamental rights, the 
right to plead directives and the limit in time of the in  validities established. But this 
has  not adversely  affected  either collaboration between  the  Court and national 
courts or the basis of the Community legal system. 
Requests for the Court's opinion 
Under the three basic Treaties the Court has the power to give opinions. But the 
Court  is  not merely  consulted  for  its  views:  its  opinion  has  precise  legal  con-
sequences. 
25 If there are doubts about whether an international agreement that the Community 
intends to conclude would be compatible with the provisions of the EEC Treaty, the 
Council, the Commission or a Member State may ask the Court of Justice for an 
opinion. If the Court's opinion is unfavourable, the Treaties must be revised before 
the agreement can come into force. 
The Court has given three such opinions. It has defined the concept of an interna-
tional agreement, ruled on the scope of the common commercial policy and clarified 
the roles of the institutions in negotiating international agreements. It found that a 
draft agreement on the establishment of a  European Laying-up Fund for  Inland 
Waterway Vessels was incompatible with the EEC Treaty, but that the Commun-
ity's responsibilities for commercial policy extended to the stabilization system of 
the International Natural Rubber Agreement negotiated within the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development. It found that the Community had exclusive 
competence to conclude an arrangement negotiated within the OECD on export 
credits. 
Similar provisions govern consideration of whether draft conventions or agreements 
negotiated by Member States, firms or private persons in  the nuclear field  are in 
conformity with the Treaties. In the only ruling given so far, the Court ruled that a 
convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials, installation and tran-
sport, could be validly concluded only if the Community was on an equal footing 
with the Member States in the areas for which the Community was responsible. In 
view of the allocation of powers between the Community and the Member States, 
the Community could only implement commitments entered into under this conven-
tion within the institutional system set up by the Euratom Treaty. 
The ECSC Treaty contains special provisions governing the adaptation of the rules 
on the exercise of the powers conferred on the High Authority. Such amendments 
are proposed jointly by the High Authority and the Council and submitted to the 
Court for its opinion. In considering them, the Court has full  power to assess all 
points of fact and of law. If  it finds the proposals compatible with the provisions of 
the Treaty, they are forwarded to Parliament for its approval. Under this heading 
the Court declared compatible with the Treaty a provision regarding authorization 
of specialization agreements on joint purchasing and sales agreements. It rejected a 
proposal concerning the grant of aids, but subsequently gave a favourable opinion 
on an amended version. 
Further conventions 
As a result of two conventions concluded by the Member States, the procedure for 
obtaining preliminary rulings has been extended, with sc11:c  amendments, to the 
26 Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Bodies Corporate and to 
the  Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in  Civil  and 
Commercial Matters. The second of these, also known as the Brussels Convention, 
has given rise to a flood of requests from national courts for preliminary rulings. 
Arbitration 
The Court may also exercise an arbitration function. When it does so, it acts pur-
suant to arbitration clauses in contracts under public or private law made by or on 
behalf of the Community. In such  cases, its jurisdiction must be  determined with 
due precision in the contract. Although such clauses are common in contracts ent-
ered into by the Commission, they have so far given rise to few cases. 
27 IV - Court procedure 
Court procedure involves two separate, successive stages, one written and one oral. 
However, a distinction must be made between direct actions and requests for preli-
minary rulings. 
Direct actions 
Direct actions are usually brought before the Court by written application sent to 
the Court Registrar by registered post. The application must contain the names of 
the parties, the subject-matter of the dispute, a brief statement of the grounds on 
which the application is based, the form of order sought by the applicant and an in-
dication of any evidence in support, together with an address for service in the place 
where the Court has its seat and the name of a  person who is authorized and has ex-
pressed willingness to accept service.  To be admissible, applications must also be 
lodged within the limitation periods determined by the Treaties. 
Once it has been received, the application is entered in the Court register. The Court 
Registrar has a notice of the action, setting out the applicant's claims, published in 
the Official journal. The President appoints a Judge-Rapporteur, whose duty it is to 
follow closely the progress of the case. The application is then served on the oppos-
ing party, who has a month in which to lodge a statement of defence. The applicant 
has a right of reply (one month) and the defendant a right of rejoinder within a fur-
ther month. The time-limits for producing these documents must be strictly adhered 
to unless specific authorization to the contrary is obtained from the President of the 
Court. 
The Court, after considering the preliminary report presented by the Judge-Rappor-
teur and hearing the advocate-general, meets in the Deliberation Room to decide 
whether a preparatory enquiry is necessary. This would involve the appearance of 
the parties, requests for documents, oral testimony, etc. 
It  also decides whether the case should be  dealt with by the full  Court or by the 
Chamber to which it has been assigned. On completion of the preparatory enquiry, 
29 where this has been found necessary, or otherwise after the tina! pleading has been 
lodged, the President sets the date of the public hearing. In a report presented at the 
hearing, the Judge-Rapporteur summarizes the alleged facts and the submissions of 
the parties and of the interveners, if any. 
The case is  then argued by  the parties at a  public hearing before the judges.  All 
points of view and all arguments may again be put before the Court. The judges and 
the advocate-general put to the parties any questions they think fit. Some weeks la-
ter the advocate-general gives his opinion, analysing the facts and the legal aspects in 
detail and proposing his solution to the dispute. There the oral procedure ends. 
The Court then prepares its decision on the basis of a draft by the Judge-Rappor-
teur. Each judge may submit, orally or in writing, a proposal for an amendment or a 
counter-proposal. If during the deliberation the Court requires further information, 
it may re-open the procedure and ask the parties to give further explanations, oral or 
written, or it may order further inquiries. 
Generally, about 18 months elapses between the lodging of an application and the 
Court's final decision. Although this time-lapse has grown longer over the years ow-
ing to the increasing number of cases, it is nevertheless still reasonable, especially 
when compared with the duration of proceedings before most courts in the Member 
States. 
An application for revision of a judgment may be made within 10 years if a decisive 
fact is discovered which was unkown when the judgment was given. 
Requests for preliminary rulings 
A national court may put to the Court of Justice a question concerning the inter-
pretation or validity of a Community provision. No particular form is prescribed for 
the submission of such a request, but it generally takes the form of a judicial decision 
(decree, judgment or order) in accordance with national legal procedure. Ideally it 
should contain a description of the case so far, a summary of the relevant facts, a 
statement of the legal problem confronting the national court and the exact text of 
the abstract question(s) which it wishes to ask the Court. Normally, it is  accom-
panied by the background documents relating to the case. The questions are sent by 
the registrar of the national court to the Registrar of the Court in Luxembourg. 
The Registrar has the application translated into all the Community languages and 
then notifies the parties concerned in the original case, the Member States, the Com-
mission and, if the case concerns a Council act, the Council. He also has a notice 
30 published in the Official journal indicating the parties concerned and the questions 
put to the Court. Those notified then have two months in which to submit observa-
tions,  Whilst  the  Commission  always  takes  advantages  of this  possibility,  the 
Council does so only where an act of its own is  at issue.  The Member States' re-
sponse varies, but on the whole they frequently avail themselves of the opportunity, 
especially when the issues raised are of major general interest of them. 
A hearing is then held at which all those entitled to submit written observations may 
present their arguments orally. The subsequent procedure is exactly the same as for 
direct actions. The Registrar sends the Court's judgment to the national court con-
cerned. On average 18  months elapse between the lodging of a request for a pre-
liminary ruling and the Court's decision. 
Judgments 
The judgments of the Court of Justice  are reached  by  majority vote.  Where the 
Court is equally divided, the vote of the most junior judge is disregarded. Since no 
dissenting opinion is made public, the judgments are signed by all the judges who 
took part in the deliberation. They are pronounced at a public hearing. 
The Court may, if it thinks fit, give an interlocutory judgment in order to provide an 
initial clarification of certain principles, or a certain part of the problems raised, and 
give its final judgment at a later stage. In certain cases the Court, having found that 
an applicant is entitled to damages, may invite the parties to reach agreement on the 
amount, while  reserving the right to make a  final  decision  if the parties cannot 
agree. 
Judgments are divided into three main parts. The first, headed 'Facts and procedure' 
described objectively the facts, the procedure followed in the case, the submissions 
of the parties and their arguments. It is followed by the central part of the judgment, 
setting out the grounds for the Court's decision. In this part the Court indicates in 
general terms the subject matter to the action, reviews the legal background and the 
history of the case, analyses the legal problems raised, and arrives at precise conclu-
sions. The latter are repeated in the third part, known as the 'operative part' of the 
judgment. 
When giving judgment the Court of Justice must also rule on costs. The only costs 
which the parties concerned have to bear are lawyers' fees, since there is no charge 
for the actual proceedings before the Court. 
31 An application for a preliminary ruling constitutes an interlocutory proceeding in an 
action pending before a national judge and it is therefore for the judge in the main 
action, and not the Court, to decide on the question of costs. 
The judgments are published in full in the European Court Reports, which appear in 
· all the official languages. A summary appears in the Official Journal. 
Interim measures and procedural disputes 
The President of the Court may order interim measures by means of a summary 
procedure; alternatively, the matter may be referred to the Court. Where the case 
concerns a decision by one of the institutions, the President may order that decision 
to be suspended pending the final judgment. The order of the President of the Court 
has only an interim effect and is without prejudice to the Court's final decision on 
the substance of the case. 
Any of the parties may apply for a decision on a preliminary objection or on any 
other procedural issue.  Most applications concern questions of admissibility. The 
Court itself decides whether to consider the application separately or whether to re-
serve its decision for the final judgment. 
The Member States and the institutions may intervene in cases before the Court. So 
also may any other person able to show a legitimate interest in the outcome of a case 
before the Court, except where the case is between Member States, between Com-
munity institutions or between Member States and institutions. The submissions 
made in the application to intervene may not have any other object than to support 
the submissions of one of the parties. 
Interventions are not allowed in the case of requests for a preliminary ruling except 
where the national court has already granted a third party the right to intervene in 
the case in question. The governments of the Member States, and the Commission 
and the Council, may always submit written or oral observations if  they consider it 
appropriate. 
Representation of  the parties 
Any lawyer qualified to practise before a court in one of the Member States and, 
where national legislation grants him that right, any professor of law is, ispo facto, 
entitled to address the Court. 
32 The parties are free to choose a lawyer from any Member State. In the case of re-
quests for a preliminary ruling, the lawyers who appear before the Court of Justice 
will, in fact, very often be those conducting the case before the national court. In 
this type of case the Court applies the same rules regarding representation of the par-
ties as the national court from which the case originates. 
The Member States and Community institutions are represented in Court by agents, 
genrally members of their legal departments, who may be assisted by a legal adviser 
or an advocate, barrister or the like. 
Languages 
Although the language rules may appear rather clumsy, they do, in fact, make access 
to the Court as straightforward as possible. Proceedings may be conducted in Dan-
ish, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Irish, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish. 
The choice of the language of the case lies with the applicant, except that: 
(i)  where the defendant is a Member State or a natural or legal person who is a na-
tional of a Member State, the language of the case is the official language of that 
State; where there is more than one official language, the applicant may choose 
whichever suits him best; 
(ii)  where both parties so request, the Court may authorize the use of another offi-
cial Community language; 
(iii) where one party so requests and where the other agrees, the Court may au-
thorize the use of another language; this option is not open to the institutions. 
Where a preliminary ruling has been requested, the language used is that of the na-
tional court which referred the case to the Court. 
The Member States may use their own official language when intervening in a case 
before the Court or making observations on a request for a preliminary ruling. 
The judges and advocates-general may speak at hearings in a language other than 
the language of the case. 
The judgment is  always delivered in the language of the case. Only documents in 
that language are authentic. 
33 Legal aid 
Where one of the parties is unable to meet all part of the costs incurred, he may re-
quest legal aid. The application must include supporting evidence. The Chamber to 
which the judge-Rapporteur belongs then decides whether to grant legal aid in full 
or in part. He gives no reasons for its decision, and there is no appeal against it. 
34 V - Activities of the Court 
The European Communtiy has an economic purpose, even though its long'-term aim 
is  political.  It  is  therefore hardly surprising that the Court's major achievements 
have been in the field of business law. But its activities go beyond purely economic 
matters and it has laid an extensive groundwork of case-law in the sphere of social 
welfare and agriculture. 
Initially, the Court's main task was to secure the attainment of the customs union. 
This involved the removal of internal tariff barriers, and measures having equivalent 
effect, between the Member States and the introduction of common rules with re-
gard to non-member countries. The gradual introduction of common rules on ag-
riculture,  transport, freedom  of establishment,  freedom  to provide  services  and 
freedom  of competition between undertakings led  subsequently to an  increasing 
number of actions. The Court also took a number of decisions on social affairs, af-
fecting the direct interests of Community citizens in such fundamental areas as the 
freedom of movement for workers and social security rights of migrant workers. 
Direct effect of  Community law 
The principles of direct applicability of Community law in the Member States and 
the primacy of Community rules over conflicting national rules are the twin pillars 
supporting the European Economic Community, a Community based on law. After 
the Treaties were ratified the Court soon had to decide a number of cases which in-
volved settling a series of fundamental questions - is  European law directly ap-
plicable as  such to the nationals of the Community? Can they invoke Community 
law direct and have that law applied by judges in their own country with the safe-
guard of common institutions? Are judges under an obligation to apply Community 
regulations, directives or decisions regardless of their own country's legislation? Do 
the Community rules laid down in the Treaties and ratified by the Member States 
take precedence over national laws? 
The Court was fully aware of what was at stake and lost no time in following the ra-
tionale of the Community to its logical conclusion and in deciding in favour of a real 
Community. 
35 The van Gend en Laos case raised the question of the direct applicability of Com-
munity law. In September 1960, the Dutch company van Gend en Laos, which had 
imported an aqueous emulsion of ureaformaldehyde from Germany for use in the 
manufacture of glue, received a claim from the Dutch customs authorities for duty 
at a rate higher than the rate current for the product at the time when the Treaty of 
Rome entered into force. 
As a result of an agreement concluded between the Benelux countries in July 1958, 
aqueous emulsions had been transferred from a category of products taxed at 3% to 
another category taxed at 8%. The glue manufacturer protested to the national au-
thorities on the grounds that the Treaty prohibited the common market countries 
from  increasing the customs duties that they applied as  between themselves on 1 
January 1958, when the Treaty entered into force. The argument was dismissed and 
the industrialist appealed to an administrative court, which suspended proceedings 
and asked the Court of  Justice whether the provisions of the Treaty of Rome, which, 
in normal circumstances, are addressed only to Member States, could vest rights in 
individuals. 
The German, Belgian and Dutch Governments submitted their observations to the 
Court. In their view, only Member States or the Commission could bring alleged in-
fringements of the Treaty before the Court. The Treaty, they maintained, conferred 
rights and imposed obligations only on the signatory States and certainly not on 
private individuals who must remain subject to their national law. 
Since the principle of  direct applicability was explicity mentioned in the Treaty in re-
lation to regulations, but not in relation to the provisions of the Treaty itself, the 
Court sought to define the principle as an integral part of the concept of the com-
mon market and of the basic consequences of membership thereof. 
With exemplary clarity the Cou·rt stated in its grounds of judgment that: 'The objec-
tive of the EEC Treaty ... is  to establish a common market, the functioning of 
which is of direct concern to interested parties in the Community.' This implies that 
this Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations be-
tween the contracting States ...  This view is confirmed more specifically by the es-
tablishment of institutions endowed with sovereign rights, the exercise of which af-
fects Member States and also 'their citizens', the conclusion being that 'the Commun-
ity  constitutes  a  new  legal  order . . .  for  the  benefit  of which  the  States  have 
limited their sovereign rights, albeit within the limited fields,  and the subjects of 
which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals. Independently of 
the legislation of Member States, Community law therefore not only imposes ob-
ligations on individuals but it also intended to confer upon them rights which be-
come part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only where they are expressly 
granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in 
a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon the Member States and upon 
36 the institutions of the Community'. Subsequent events have done nothing to call into 
question the principles laid down by the Court. The national courts have not re-
lented in their application of the principle. 
Primacy of  Community law 
The Court also based itself on the logic of the new law in its affirmation of the 
primacy of Community law. Several months after the judgment establishing the di-
rect applicability of Community law, a Milan judge brought before the Court a re-
quest for interpretation of the Treaty in a case calling for clarification of the situa-
tion in the event of a conflict between Community law and national law. 
Mr Falminio Costa, a shareholder in Edison Volta, considered that he had suffered 
injury through the nationalization of the facilities for the production and distribu-
tion of  electricity in his country. He refused to pay a bill for a few hundred lire pre-
sented  by  the new nationalized company, ENEL.  Summoned  before  a  court in 
Milan, he submitted in his defence that the nationalization law was contrary to the 
Treaty of Rome: the judge in the case therefore approached the Court of  Justice. In 
the meantime, the Italian constitutional court had intervend in connection with the 
law establishing ENEL. In its view, the situation was straightforward: as the Rome 
Treaty had been ratified by an ordinary law, the provisions of a later conflicting law 
would have to take precedence over those of the Treaty. 
In Luxembourg, the judges took a different view. In its judgment the Court pointed 
out that: 'By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institu-
tions, its own personality, its own legal capacity of representation on the interna-
tional plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sove-
reignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the Community, the Member 
States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus 
created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves. 
The integration into the laws of  each Member State of  provisions which derive from 
the Community, and more generally the terms and the spirit of the Treaty, make it 
impossible for the States, as a corollary, to accord precedence to a unilateral and 
subsequent measure over a legal system accepted by them on a basis of reciprocity.' 
The judges went on to say that: 'The executive force of Community law cannot vary 
from one State to another in deference to subsequent domestic laws, without jeo-
pardizing the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty set out in Article 5 (2) and 
giving rise to the discrimination prohibited by Article 7. The obligations undertaken 
under the Treaty establishing the Community would not be unconditional, but mere-
ly contingent, if they could be called in question by subsequent legislative acts of the 
signatories .. .'. 
37 'The precedence of Community law is confirmed by Article 189, whereby a regula-
tion "shall be binding" and "directly applicable in all Member States". This provision, 
which is subject to no reservation, would be quite meaningless if a State could uni-
laterally nullify its effects by means of a legislation measure which could prevail over 
Community law.' The judges concluded that: 'It follows from all these observations 
that the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, 
because of its special and agricultural nature, be overridden by domestic legal provi-
sion, however framed, without being deprived of its character as  Community law 
and without the legal basis of the Community itself being called into question. 
The transfer by the States from their domestic legal system to the Community legal 
system of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a perma-
nent limitation of their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act 
incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot prevail.' 
The Court clarified this concept in the Simmenthal case, another locus classicus. 
Community provisions, it held, 'are a direct source of rights and duties for all those 
affected thereby, whether Member States or individuals, who are parties to legal re-
lationships under Community law.  This consequence also concerns any national 
court whose task it is as an organ of a Member State to protect, in a case within its 
jurisdiction,  the  rights  conferred  upon  individuals  by  Community  law.  Fur-
thermore, in accordance with the principle of the precedence of Community law, the 
relationships between provisions of the Treaty and directly applicable measures of 
the institutions on the one hand and the national law of the Member States on the 
other is such that those provisions and measures not only by their entry into force 
render automatically inapplicable any conflicting provision of current national law 
but-in so far as they are an integral part of, and take precedence in, the legal order 
applicable in the territory of each of the Member States - also preclude the valid 
adoption of new national legislative measures to the extent to which they would be 
incompatible with Community provisions.' According to the Court, it follows that 'a 
national court which is  called upon, within the limits of its jurisdiction, to apply 
provisions of Community law is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, 
if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of national 
legislation, even if adopted subsequently, and it is not necessary for the court tore-
quest or even await the prior setting aside of such provisions by legislative or other 
constitutional means.' 
Protection of  fundamental rights 
A German vine-grower, Mrs Liselotte Hauer, gave the Court an opportunity to rule 
on the need to ensure the protection of fund~mental rights in the Community legal 
order. 
38 She had applied for authorization to plant vines on land which she owned. The au-
thorization was refused on the grounds that the new planting of vines was tempo-
rarily prohibited by a Community regulation. She appealed against that decision to 
the competent Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht), arguing that the Com-
munity provisions infringed her rights as  owner of the property and her right to 
pursue her business activities freely. 
Wishing to ensure the substantive unity and effectiveness of Community law, the 
Court of Justice declared that the question of an infringement of fundamental rights 
by a measure taken by the Community institutions could only be judged in the light 
of Community law itself. Accordingly, it was for the Court alone to define the na-
ture of the guarantees afforded. 
Although fully  aware of the risk of conflict with national constitutional law, the 
Court nevertheless emphasized that 'fundamental rights form an integral part of the 
general principles of the law, the observance of which it ensures'. In safeguarding 
those rights, it was 'bound to draw inspiration from constitutional traditions com-
mon to the Member States, so that measures which are incompatible with the funda-
mental rights recognized by the constitution of those States are unacceptable in the 
Community'. It also took account of international treaties for the protection of hu-
man rights on which the Member States had collaborated or of which they were sig-
natories. It follows  that the protection accorded under Community law for funda-
mental human rights could not be any less complete than that required by the const-
itution of any of the Member States. 
The Court nevertheless drew attention to the fact that, under the constitutional rules 
and practices of the Member States, there were certain fundamental rights- in this 
case the right to property and the freedom to pursue trade or professional activities 
- which, far from constituting unfettered prerogatives, must be regulated in the 
light of their social function, always provided that any restrictive action does not de-
rogate from the real substance of the right in question. 
Freedom of  trade 
The basic economic objective of the Community is to establish a common market, 
and the fundamental expression of this is the customs union. Under the terms of the 
Treaty of Rome it covers all trade in goods and involves the prohibition between 
Member States of customs duties and quantitative restrictions on imports and ex-
ports and the adoption of a common customs tariff in their relations with non-mem-
ber countries. But the rules on freedom of movement do not apply only to the pro-
ducts of  Member States, but also to products from non-member countries in free cir-
culation in a Member State. 
39 The majority of governments, frequently under pressure from business circles, were 
reluctant to remove protective barriers and face  competition from their partners. 
Their reaction was to maintain or introduce taxes, restrictions and sometimes even 
overt or disguised prohibitions on imports. When cases of this type came before the 
Court, it banned such measures, reminding the Member States that they were ob-
liged to respect the objectives laid down in the Treaties. 
Charges having equivalent effect to customs duties 
To prevent the prohibitions being circumvented, the authors of the Treaty also ex-
pressly prohibited charges having equivalent effect to customs duties and measures 
having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions; this means measures which, al-
though not quotas, nevertheless  have the same restrictive effect,  in that they (to 
quote the classic words of the Dassonville judgment) 'directly or indirectly, actually 
or potentially' formed an obstacle to trade between Member States. Governments 
displayed remarkable powers of ingenuity and imagination. A profusion of special 
taxes sprang up: statistical duties on imported or exported goods, taxes for admin-
istrative formalities on importation, charges for health inspections, taxes on packag-
ing, taxes on the export of works of art. 
Both  in  actions against the States concerned and in cases referred for preliminary 
rulings, no matter what they were called or how they were applied, whether they 
were imposed by the State or by public or private institutions, for the benefit of the 
State or of business firms, the Court pounced on them whenever they had even the 
slightest discriminatory effect on products originating in the Member States or on 
goods that were in free circulation in the EEC because they had crossed the Com-
munity's borders. Notable instances included an ad valorem tax of 0.33% on the 
import of unworked diamonds, the proceeds of which went towards a welfare fund 
for diamond workers to provide them with certain additional welfare benefits. Even 
a general system of taxation may be incompatible with the Treaty if the proceeds go 
to fund activities specifically benefiting a national product. The Court has allowed 
exceptions only when the charges constitute payment for a service actually rendered 
to the trader, the amount being commensurate with that service, or if the charge is 
part of a general internal system regularly applied according to uniform criteria to 
national products, imports and exports alike. Charges imposed uniformly by Com-
munity provisions are allowed only if the amount does not exceed the actual cost of 
the service. 
·Any taxes paid without due reason must be repaid. The Court has defined the fol-
lowing criteria, particularly in the San Giorgio case: the right to obtain repayment of 
taxes charged by a Member State in infringement of the rules of Community law is 
the consequence and the complement of the rights conferred on interested parties by 
the Community provisions prohibiting taxes having an effect equivalent to customs 
40 duties. Although the repayment cannot be claimed otherwise than under the condi-
tions of substance and form laid down by the various national laws on the subject, 
such conditions cannot be less favourable than those relating to similar claims of a 
purely internal nature, and cannot be such as to make the exercise of the rights con-
ferred by the Community legal order practically impossible. 
Community law does not prevent a national legal system from refusing repayment 
of taxes charged without due reason if this would involve an unjust enrichment of 
the persons entitled. There is thus nothing to prevent the courts from taking into ac-
count, in accordance with their national law, the fact that the taxes improperly 
charged have been included in the price of goods and thus passed on to the purchas-
ers. 
On the other hand, any requirements as to evidence are incompatible with Com-
munity law if they have the effect of making it practically impossible or excessively 
difficult to obtain repayment of taxes charged in infringement of Community law. 
Such is the case in particular of presumptions or rules of evidence which impose on 
the taxpayer the burden of showing that the taxes paid without due reason have not 
been passed on to others, or special limitations on the form of the evidence to be ad-
duced, such as the exclusion of any form of proof other than documentary evidence. 
The customs union necessarily implies that Member States may not obstruct or 
impede the movement of goods in transit. They may not therefore apply to goods in 
transit on their territory any transit duties or other charge concerning transit. How-
ever, charges representing the costs of transport or the cost of other services linked 
with transport are compatible with the Treaty. 
Measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions 
The Member States tried to get round the liberalization provisions by means of dis-
crimiatory  administrative  measures.  The  Belgian  Government,  for  example, 
imposed special administrative formalities on whisky importers to exclude all but di-
rect imports from Scotland. However, since the majority of Scottish products ex-
ported to the Continent travel via France for the practical reason of centralized ship-
ment, these formalities amounted to a quantitative restriction and the Court accord-
ingly ruled against them. 
In the Cassis de Dijon case the Court held that fixing a minimum alcoholic strength 
for  alcoholic beverages  was a  prohibited measure of equivalent effect,  if in  one 
Member State it was applied to alcoholic beverages lawfully produced and marketed 
in another Member State. The German spirits monopoly law (Branntweinmonopol-
gesetz) fixed  a minimum alcoholic strength for specific categories of liqueurs and 
other alcoholic beverages. A German firm which planned to import Cassis de Dijon 
41 was turned down by  the Federal Monopoly Administration (Bundesmonopolver-
waltung), on the grounds that the alcoholic strength was inadequate and that the 
product in question did not satisfy the conditions required for marketing in the Fed-
eral Republic.  In  its preliminary ruling the Court did not deny Member States the 
right to control the production and marketing of spirits within their own territory. 
But it emphasized that mandatory fixing of minimum strengths was neither an es-
sential guarantee of the fairness of commercial transactions nor a purpose which is 
in the general interest such as to take precedence over the requirements of the free 
movement of goods. 
German wine legislation reserved the use of a specific bottle called a Bocksbeutel for 
quality  wines  produced  in  Franconia,  Baden-Franconia  and  four  munkipalities 
located in central Baden. This bottle, which has a characteristic bulbous shape, has 
been used for centuries in Franconia. In Northern Italy, in the region of Balzano, it 
also has a tradition going back more than a hundred years. The Court, asked for a 
ruling on whether the German legislation was protectionist, ruled that a Member 
State cannot reserve the use of a particular shape of bottle for certain national pro-
ducts when the use of that shape or a similar shape of bottle accords with a  fair and 
traditional practice in the State of origin.  The Court did not dispute the right of 
Member States to enact measures designed to avoid confusion in the minds of con-
sumers between wines of different origin and of different qualities. It pointed out 
however that the Community provisions on the labelling of wines make it possible 
to avoid such confusion. 
Similarly the Court refused to allow Germany the right to reserve the designations 
Sekt and Weinbrand for home products, on the grounds that no Member State could 
be allowed to extend, by the artificial means of legislation, a generic term into a 
designation of origin in order to give domestic producers an advantage. 
Certain Member States required that margarine should be  marketed only in cube-
shaped containers, ostensibly to avoid any confusion between butter and margarine. 
The Court did not hesitate to rule that this constituted a measure having equivalent 
effect to a quantitative restriction. While it did not deny the need for measures to 
protect consumers from confusion as between butter and margarine, it felt that this 
objective could be attained more effectively by less restrictive means, such as strict 
labelling requirements. 
In  an action for infringement of the Treaty brought by the Commission when the 
Irish Government organized a 'Buy Irish' campaign, the Court ruled that the cam-
paign contravened the rules on free movement of goods: it was evidence of a de-
liberate intention to persuade people to buy home-produced goods rather than im-
ported goods, and thus to impede imports from other Member States. 
The Court has also held that Member States m~y  not require that a firm, in order to 
sell its products, must have a registered office or a representative on their territory. 
42 It has recognized, for example in the Roussel case, that Member States are entitled 
to take specific measures to eliminate inflation, but has made it clear that they must 
not discriminate against imported products in relation to national products. 
Equality of taxation 
The Member States have also frequently used taxation - the expression par ex-
cellence of their sovereignty - as a means of restricting imports. The Treaty estab-
lishing the European Economic Community, while not aimed at taking away the 
Member States' right to levy taxes, does stipulate that internal taxes, whatever their 
nature, must be applied without discrimination to domestic products as well as to 
products from other Member States and must not be misused for purely protectio-
nist ends.  The same principle applies to preferential tax arrangements; any such 
specific arrangements must be extended without discrimination to products of other 
Member States and with no distinctions based on the grounds for  them. A large 
numer of actions have been brought against internal tax schemes, which have often 
been limited to particular industries or even to particular products; for example, 
there have been cases involving discriminatory taxation on imported spirits, discri-
minatory tax rebates for the engineering industry, excise duty on cocoa imports and 
a tax on imported timber. 
The prohibition on tax discrimination does not apply only to similar products but 
also to products in partial or potential competition. In a famous case that lasted for 
five years because of the complexity of the subject, the Court told various Member 
States that they do not have the right to distort competition between light wines and 
beer; there is a distinct tendency-at least in certain Member States-to favour the 
'national' drink. Obviously the Court did not lay down a scale of correct taxes but it 
emphasized that the conformity of taxation with the Treaty must be evaluated by 
reference to the volume, the alcoholic strength and the price of the products. In 
other cases the Court condemned discrimination against wine made from grapes in 
relation to wine made from fruit, and against whisky, gin and vodka in relation to 
national spirits made from fruit. 
Some time ago France imposed two types of annual tax on motor vehicles: a diffe-
rential tax on vehicles of not more than 16 h.p. and a special tax on vehicles of more 
than 16 h.p. The special tax was the multiple of the differential tax and in fact ap-
plied only to imported vehicles.  A motorist, Michel Humblot, refused to pay the 
special tax and the Court upheld his point of view. It pointed out that the Member 
States are free to subject vehicles to a system of road tax in which the amount in-
creases progressively in relation to an objective criterion such as the horse power; 
the tax must, however, have no discriminatory or protectionist effects. 
43 Justified exceptions 
The Treaty does not prevent the imposition of restrictions justified on the grounds 
of public morality, public policy or public security, prevention of unfair competi-
tion,  protection  of the  health  and  life  of humans  and  protection  of national 
treasures. The Court has nevertheless emphasized on numerous occasions and in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the Treaty that these prohibitions or restrictions 
must not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
trade between Member States, nor limit imports or exports more than is necessary 
to attain a legitimate objective. 
The Court has applied these principles in a large number of cases. Thus, the United 
Kingdom had decided to slaughter rather than vaccinate poultry in order to combat 
Newcastle disease. 
It had at the same time prohibited the importation of poultrymeat from Member 
States authorizing vaccination. The Court did not dispute the right of the United 
Kingdom to prevent the spread of the disease; but it held that the absolute prohibi-
tion on imports of poultrymeat was excessive and hence unjustified, since it was ap-
plicable permanently even in the absence of any indication of the disease. France at 
one period subjected imports of Italian wine to excessively frequent analyses, thus 
delaying their arrival on its internal market. The Court condemned the protectionist 
character of this measure. In both cases it took into account the pressure known to 
have been exercised by local producers  .. 
Parallel imports 
Thus the Court has opened the way for parallel imports. Deutsche Grammophon, 
the German gramophone record manufacturer sold its records in Germany at a con-
trolled price which was higher than the price at which they were sold in other Com-
munity countries by licensed agents with exclusive distribution rights in their na-
tional territory. Another German company had managed to obtain a supply of re-
cords from one of these agents, which it reimported and was able to sell in Germany 
at an appreciably lower price  than that imposed  by  the manufacturer.  This the 
manufacturer held to be an infringement of German copyright law. The Court ruled 
that, copyright notwithstanding, it is not permissible to prohibit the sale in a Mem-
ber State of products placed on the market in  another Member State, even if the 
selling price in the first country is higher than in other countries. 
Protection of industrial property 
Community law allows conditional exceptions to the principle of free movements in 
order to protect industrial and commercial property. But patent and trade mark rights 
44 are often used to wall off markets. A classic example involved certain practices on 
the market for pharmaceutical products. The Court has always made it clear that re-
strictions on the free circulation of goods can be allowed only in exceptional cir-
cumstances and only insofar as they are necessary to safeguard rights which con-
stitute the specific subject-matter of industrial and commercial property rights pro-
tected by the Treaty of Rome. This specific subject-matter is, in the Court's view, 
principally the guarantee that the holder, to reward his creative effort or to protect 
the reputation of his trade mark, has the sole right to exploit an invention for the 
purpose of manufacturing industrial products and putting them into circulation for 
the first time, either directly or by granting licences to third parties, as well as the 
right to oppose any infringement. This right, however, is exhausted once the pro-
duct is first marketed, the holder thereafter being unable to oppose parallel market-
ing. The Court stressed that if the holder of a patent or trade mark were allowed to 
ban imports of protected products marketed in another Member State by him or 
with his consent, he would be able to partition off the national markets, so restrict-
ing trade between the Member States, although this is not necessary to protect the 
substance of the rights conferred by the patent or trade mark. 
Moreover, the holder of an exclusive right may not plead that right if the resulting 
ban  on imports and sales  entails  a  restriction  on competition  within  the EEC. 
Though this right, being a creature of the law, is not itself covered by the rules of the 
Treaty of Rome concerning agreements or concerted practices in restraint of com-
petition, the exercise of this right may be caught by the prohibitions if it constitutes 
the  subject  matter, the means or the consequence of a  restrictive  agreement,  a 
concerted pratice or abuse of a dominant position. 
Mainly through preliminary rulings, the principle of exhaustion has been gradually 
(and logically) extended to copyright, model rights, rights in respect of slavish imita-
tion and plant breeders' right. This principle does not, however, apply in relations 
with  non-member  countries  (including  those  linked  with  the  Community  by 
economic agreements). 
Transfers of currency 
The liberation of transfers of currency can be attained only gradually, because of its 
close link with economic and monetary policy, which is a matter essentially within 
the responsibility of the Member States, and the possible dangers for national bal-
ances of payments. However, current payments relating to the movement of goods, 
services and capital, in the currency of the Member State where the creditor or the 
beneficiary resides, have already been liberated. Recognizing the lawfulness of the 
restrictions, the Court held in  the Thompson case that Krugerrands and national 
coins which are legal tender are not goods within the meaning of the Community 
rules on freedom of movement, even if their commercial value exceeds their nominal 
value. 
45 Guerrino Casati, an Italian national resident in Germany, had entered Italy with a 
substantial sum in  German banknotes without having at the time of import com-
pleted the formalities prescribed by the Italian exchange regulations.  Not having 
spent the banknotes, Mr Casati was charged, when leaving Italy, with illegal export 
of currency.  The Court held  that transfers  of cur-
rency in the form of banknotes have not yet been li-
berated by the Treaty, and that the Member States 
may impose restrictions on such transfers even if they 
are  intended for  the purchase of goods.  In  another 
case, the Court held on the other hand that tourists, 
students and business travellers have the right to ex-
port banknotes within certain limits since expendi-
ture on those activities constitutes payment for goods 
or services. 
Nearly 30 years after the creation of the European 
Economic· Community,  the  process  of achieving  a 
single common market cannot be considered to have 
been completed. The Court still  has to deal with a 
considerable number of restrictive and protectionist 
measures. 
Competition 
The principle of free  and fair competition is  funda-
mental to the Treaty of Rome, which was designed to 
guarantee all businessmen free access to the common 
market. The relevant rules are based on Articles 85 
and 86 which, as is now well known, prohibit agree-
ments, decisions and concerted practics by firms or 
groups of firms and any abuse of a dominant position 
likely to have a direct or indirect, immediate or po-
tential  impact  on  trade  between  Member  States. 
There are many forms of anti-competitive conduct, 
and  the  Treaty,  without  attempting  to  give  an 
exhaustive list, mentions some of them specifically -
directly or indirectly fixing prices or other terms of 
business,  limiting  or controlling  production,  mar-
kets, technical development or investments, sharing 
markets or sources of supply, unfair trading condi-
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tions and tying clauses. The Court's decisions over the years have brought to light 
various others. 
Agreements and concerted practices do not qualify for exemption unless they help to 
improve  the  production or distribution  of products  or to promote technical  or 
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47 economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the benefit. Nor must 
they impose on the firms involved restrictions that are not indispensable to the at-
tainment of these objectives or enable them to eliminate competition for  a  sub-
stantial proportion of the products in question. 
The advantages must be evident and general; individual advantages to the firms in-
volved will  not suffice.  No similar exemptions exist for dominant positions:  the 
Treaty does not forbid dominant positions as such, but only their abuse. 
A fertile field of litigation 
On the basis of rules laid down by the Council, the Commission enforces these prin-
ciples, investigates infringements and, by means of decisions addressed directly to 
the firms concerned, orders them to be  stopped, imposing fines where necessary. 
The firms concerned may then appeal against the decision to the Court. National 
courts have also rapidly become familiar with  Community competition law and 
they, too, refer cases to Luxembourg, since the competition rules are directly ap-
plicable in all the Member States. 
The rules of competition apply to a wide range of activities and there have been 
numerous cases, involving both the big multinationals and small businesses. The 
Court has given judgment in cases covering a wide range of industrial and commer-
cial activities- radios, dyestuffs, quinine, cement, metal containers, sugar, beer, 
bananas, cigarettes, perfumes, lighters, household appliances, vitamins, medicines, 
cars, tyres, etc. 
Generally speaking, when the Commission imposes penalties on firms they waste no 
time in taking the matter to the Court. The outcome of such action has varied enor-
mously.  Some of the Commission's decisions have been upheld, in others minor 
changes have been made and in yet others the decision has been annulled or the fines 
reduced. But this is not to say that firms can count on the Court's clemency. Whilst 
it adjusts the Commission's errors of assessment, the Court has been just as vigorous 
in its general approach to the rules of competition. 
The Commission's powers of investigation 
When the major electronics company IBM  tried to block or at least hold up the 
Commission's investigations into its commercial practices at the enquiry stage, the 
Court held its action to be inadmissible. The Court ruled that, given their nature 
and the legal effects they produce, neither the initiation of an administrative proce-
dure nor a statement of objections could be considered as being decisions within the 
meaning of the Treaty, which may be challenged in an action for a declaration that 
48 they are void; they constituted no more than procedural measures adopted prepa-
ratory to the decision which represents their culmination. 
The Commission's powers of investigation have their limits.  The Court upheld a 
claim  by  the  zinc  producer  AM&S  Europe  that  the  confidentiality  of corres-
pondence between companies and their legal advisers was protected as long as the 
correspondence fell  within the framework of the  rights  of the defence  and was 
conducted with a lawyer who was not an employee of his client. If  a company under 
investigation refuses to disclose this specific correspondence, it must nevertheless 
provide the Commission's authorized officers, without revealing the contents, with 
particulars proving that it satisfies the conditions on which legal protection depends. 
It is for the Court to settle disputes as to how the protection is to the applied. 
In the Akzo case the Court held that a third-party complainant cannot in any cir-
cumstances be informed, in the course of an enquiry, of the contents of documents 
containing a firm's business secrets. Before handing over any documents the Com-
mission is bound to take a decision, setting out its reasons, which must be brought 
to the firm's notice. It must also give the firm an opportunity of asking the Court to 
review the Commission's evaluation and order it not to disclose the documents. 
The Court has confirmed the Commission's authority to order interim measures in 
connection with the preservation of free competition, in particular to ensure that de-
cisions ordering firms to stop infringements are effectively implemented. But it has 
stipulated that such measures can be taken only in urgent cases. They must also be 
of a temporary and conservatory nature and be confined to what the situation re-
quires. Finally, the decision ordering interim measures must be in a form which can 
be attacked before the Court of Justice. 
It has similarly confirmed the Commission's right to impose fines on firms committ-
ing infringements, and to fix these at a deterrent level, within the limits prescribed 
by the Community regulation on competition. 
Territorial application 
On numerous occasions the Court has clarified the territorial aspects of the rules of 
competition, a good example being the dyestuffs case. Nine dyestuffs manufacturers 
appealed against a Commission decision imposing fines on them for concerted pric-
ing.  Three of them had their head offices outside the Community and argued that 
the Commission could not impose fines  for  infringements committed outside the 
Communtiy. The Court established that the firms had fixed prices and other terms 
of sale and imposed them on their subsidiaries; it accordingly upheld the Commis-
sion's measures even in  respect of the firms  not located on Community territory, 
since the effects of the concerted practice were felt within the common market. 
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ritory of only one Member State could not affect trade between Member States so 
that one of the essential tests of the Community competition rules was not satisfied. 
The Court, however, held that'an agreement extending over the whole of the ter-
ritory of a Member State by its very nature has the effect of reinforcing the compart-
mentalization of  markets on a national basis, thereby holding up the economic inter-
pretation which  the  Treaty is  designed  to bring about and protecting domestic 
production'. 
Can national rules on competition conflict with Community rules?  Seven German 
firms raised the price of aniline on a number of occasions at the same time. They 
were fined by the competent German authorities and also ran the risk of being fined 
by the Commission. The Court endorsed the Commission's view.  In keeping with 
the aims of the Treaty it ruled that application of national competition rules could 
only be permitted if they did not prejudice uniform application of the rules of the 
Treaty thoughout the common market. In theory therefore two parallel proceedings 
could be in progress at the same time. To avoid any duplication of penalties for the 
same offence the fine in the first case has to be taken into consideration when de-
termining the fine in the second case. 
Agreements and concerted practices 
In the dyestuffs case, which involved the major European chemical firms, the Court 
held that the term 'concerted practice' covers a form of coordination between under-
takings which, without involving  any actual  agreement, knowingly substitutes a 
practical cooperation between them for the risks of competition. 
A selective distribution system may be lawful if it maintains a specialized trade, ca-
pable of furnishing specific services for highly technical products of high quality, 
and those services justify a reduction in price competition in favour of competition 
in aspects other than price. The restrictions are not acceptable, however, unless they 
do in fact aim at achieving an improvement in competition. Thus the choice of re-
tailers must be made by reference to objective, qualitative criteria relating to the 
professional qualifications of the retailer and of his staff and the nature of his estab-
lishment. These conditions must be fixed in a uniform manner in relation to all po-
tential retailers and applied in a non-discriminatory manner. 
Abuse of a dominant position 
In its judgment on the United Brands case, involving the banana market, the Court 
defined a dominant position as 'a position of  economic strength enjoyed by an under-
taking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the rel-
evant market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent indepen-
dently of its competitors, customers and ultiptately of its consumers'. Abuse was 
then defined in another case as behaviour by a dominant firm 'which is such as to in-
fluence the structure of a market where, as a result of the very presence of the firm in 
question, the degree of competition was weakened and which, through recourse to 
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hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or 
the growth of that competition'. 
In  the Continental Can case,  concerning the metal  containers market the Court 
pointed to the logical link between Article 85 on restrictive practices and Article 86 
on abuse of a dominant position. It stressed that the rules of competition form a co-
herent system, with no loopholes. Moreover, it ruled the prohibition on abuse of a 
dominant position also applies when a firm acquires such a degree of dominance as 
a result of takeovers or mergers that competition is substantially fettered. 
Supply contracts cannot prevent a purchaser from using the goods supplied in a way 
that suits his own economic interests. In the Court's view there  is  a  restriction of 
competition when a contract imposes on a purchaser the obligation to use the goods 
supplied for his own needs, not to resell them in a specified area, and not to acquire 
customers in another specified area without first informing the seller. 
A refusal to supply can also constitute abuse of a dominant position. In the Com-
mercial Solvents case the Court held that a dominant firm on the market for a raw 
material, which, with the object of reserving such raw material for manufacturing 
its own derivatives, refused to supply a customer, itself a manufacturer of these de-
rivatives, thereby eliminating all competition on the part of this customer, was abus-
ing its dominant position. 
The same applies to a  fidelity  rebate where it tends, by conferring financial  ad-
vantages, to prevent customers from obtaining supplies from competing producers. 
Franchising agreements 
A franchising  agreement concluded for  the sale  of wedding dresses  enabled the 
Court to clarify the conformity of these agreements, a modern form of production 
and marketing, with the Treaty rules on competition. In  its  judgment in the Pro-
nuptia case, which was confined to distribution agreements, the Court found that 
their  compatibility generally depends  on the clauses  of the  agreements and  the 
economic context in which they are concluded. In particular, the franchisor is en-
titled to prevent the know-how and the assistance he has provided being used for the 
benefit of competitors and to arrange for the control indispensable to the preserva-
tion of the identity and the reputation of the network symbolized by his trade mark. 
The franchisor and the franchisee may not, on the other hand, agree on a sharing of 
markets. The franchisor may, however, indicate to the franchisee certain recom-
mended prices, provided there is  no concerted practice between the franchisor and 
the franchisees, or between the franchisees, with a view to actually applying these 
prices. 
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Restrictive practices and the abuse of a dominant position can also apply to patents, 
trade marks and the like.  The Court ruled that an association enjoying a de facto 
monopoly in a certain Member State for the management of copyrights, which de-
manded global  assignment of all  copyrights, without making any  distinction be-
tween specific categories of rights, extending for a certain period after the member 
concerned had withdrawn, was abusing its dominant position. In the Sacchi case, 
the Court ruled that the grant of the exclusive right to transmit television signals 
does not in itself constitute an infringement of the Treaty. Discrimination by under-
takings enjoying such exclusive rights against nationals of Member States by reason 
of their nationality is, however, incompatible with Community law. 
In  a judgment concerning imports of cosmetics, the Court confirmed that trade-
mark rights as  such are not covered by Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, but conti-
nue to protect the advantages inherent in their specific subject-matter. It also ruled 
that the exercise of industrial and commercial property rights may still be modified 
by the restrictions imposed by the rules of competition, particularly when it is apt to 
lead to a partitioning of markets and thus to impair the free movement of goods. 
Public undertakings and transport 
Like  private firms,  public undertakings, meaning those companies on which  the 
public authorities may directly or indirectly exert a dominant influence through 
ownership,  financial  holdings  or the rules  governing  them,  and, within  certain 
limits, companies responsible for running services of general economic interest are 
also covered by the competition rules. Dismissing the application by France, Italy 
and the  United  Kingdom  for  annulment of the directive  on the  transparency of 
financial relations between the Member States and public undertakings, the Court 
confirmed the Commission's right to adopt the necessary directives and to ask the 
Member States for specific information concerning public funds released to public 
undertakings and their actual use. 
In giving its preliminary ruling in the Nouvelles Frontieres case, the Court made it 
clear that the transport sector in general and air transport in particular are subject to 
the Treaty competition rules. Since no specific rules on air transport have been ad-
opted at Community level, the administrative authorities and the courts of Member 
States remain competent to apply Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty. The Commission 
may always, either on the request of a Member State or on its own initiative, carry 
out enquiries into cases of infringement, propose means of bringing them to an end, 
issue  a reasoned decision finding  that there is  an infringement and authorize the 
Member States to take the necessary measures according to the conditions and de-
tailed procedures laid down. In any event, Member States may not approve air fares 
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sion between associations of undertakings or a concerted practice. 
State aids 
But the Commission's powers do not stop at information. By means of a procedure 
laid down in the Treaty it has the authority to appraise public aid schemes and, if 
need be, insist that the State concerned terminate or adjust any aid scheme which is 
incompatible with the common market, adversely affects trade between the Member 
States and distorts competition. Here again, the Commission has had the full sup-
port of the Court, particularly in cases where the Member States refused to act on 
the decisions within the time allowed. 
The Court has enormous scope in applying the rules of free competition to the mar-
ket place. By means of  its decisions, it has succeeded in imposing and enforcing these 
rules in the interests of the consumer, the small retailer- who is at the mercy of re-
strictive  practices  and agreements  - and of businesses  themselves,  looking for 
security in the law and for protection from predatory competition. The Court has 
not  hesitated  to  impose  penalties  for  abuses  when  necessary,  but  has  shown 
tolerance when the consumer was not affected and competing goods were available. 
The rules of competition are now recognized throughout the Community thanks to 
a threefold approach: preventive and repressive action by the Commission, the di-
rect effect of the Treaty and its uniform application by national courts and the Court 
of  Justice. 
The agricultural common market 
The agricultural common market is undoubtedly the area in which the Community 
has made its greatest strides towards integration. The Treaty of Rome drew the 
basic outlines of the market, and over the years the Council, acting on Commission 
proposals,  has  gradually  completed  the  picture  by  setting  up  the  various 
mechanisms which now ensure that European farmers obtain remunerative prices 
for  their products  on a  single  market where  all  but a  few  of the products  are 
regulated by their own special set of measures. A protective import levy imposed as 
a safeguard against imports entering the Community from non-member countries at 
low prices and an export refund system helps Community farmers find buyers for 
their produce on the world market by aligning their prices on world market prices. 
The complexity of the market, the technical refinement of the system, the monetary 
difficulties and the subsequent introduction of monetary compensatory amounts, 
along with clever operators making use of the inevitable loopholes in  the system, 
have fostered much litigation. In this respect the common agricultural policy is top 
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sector rested with the national courts and the Court of Justice. 
Oddly enough, it is not the farmers who have brought most of the agricultural cases 
before the Court. Apart from the Italian farmer (a woman as it happens) who had to 
go before the Court in order to obtain payment of the premiums to which she was 
entitled for slaughtering her cows, or the German farmer who attempted (in vain) to 
have the co-responsibility levy which had been introduced as  a means of curbing 
milk production declared contrary to the Treaty, most of the legal proceedings at 
the European Court have been brought as a result of commercial transactions or of 
disputes  concerning levies,  refunds,  denaturing premiums or monetary compen-
satory amounts. Thus it is mainly traders who have kept the Court busy. 
It  is  also  worth noting that the  number of cases  handled  by  the  courts varies 
considerably, and always has done, from one Member State to another. In Germany 
and Italy in particular, those concerned have not been slow to bring their cases be-
fore  the  national  courts.  Yet  the  largest  agricultural  nation  in  the Community 
(France) has produced the smallest number of cases. The Commission has brought 
an increasing number of cases against Member States for failure to meet their obliga-
tions. They have involved such matters as the taxation of milk products, the pre-
miums for slaughtering dairy cows, the premiums for grubbing-up fruit trees, the 
implementation of the directives on forest materials, the taxes on potable spirits, the 
establishment of the viticultural land register and the payment of export refunds. 
Confirmation of basic principles 
A mass of case-law has confirmed the basic principles of the common agricultural 
policy, particularly the unity of the market, Community preference, liability for un-
lawful acts ~nd the obligation to make due reparation, as well as the legislative au-
tonomy of the common organizations of the market and the uniformity of the legal 
system. 
The rules laid down for establishing the common market apply to agricultural pro-
ducts whenever no exception is provided for. The Court has always taken a narrow 
view of exceptions. It has upheld them only when the general rules clashed with 
principles held to be essential in implementing the common agricultural policy. It 
has ruled out the view that either the rules or the principles should take precedence, 
and has concentrated on reconciling them. 
The judges in Luxembourg endeavour in their decisions to uphold the objectives, 
guidelines and methods of the common agricultural policy as defined in the Treaty. 
Again and again they have made it perfectly clear that once the Community has ad-
opted legislation setting up a common organization of a particular market the Mem-
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derogate from it or run counter to it. National measures or practices likely to inter-
fere with import or export trends or to affect the free formation of  prices on the mar-
ket are accordingly to be regarded as incompatible with the common organization of 
the market, which aims at ensuring freedom of trade within the Community by elim-
inating not only barriers to trade but also any arrangements likely to distort intra-
Community trade. Whenever a Member State or its regional or other authorities go 
beyond the intervention provided for in the Community rules there is a potential ob-
stacle to smooth operation of the common organization of the market. 
Only very rarely has the Court annulled a Council or Commission regulation. Such 
a decision can only be justified if the institution concerned has seriously overstepped 
its powers. Typical instances are the milk-powder case, the case involving produc-
tion refunds for gritz made from maize (quellmehl) and the isoglucose case. 
Implementation of the technical measures associated with the agricultural common 
market has led to major legal disputes concerning export refunds, levies, denaturing 
premiums, threshold prices, intervention prices and so on. 
One of the prerequisites for smooth operation of a system laying down common 
prices for agricultural produce as part of a market organization based on a standard 
unit of account is that the relationship between the various national currencies must 
remain stable. However, serious disturbances on the currency markets forced the 
Council to seek a remedy so as to uphold the common price system, and this was 
how monetary compensatory amounts came to be introduced. Numerous judgments 
by the Court have confirmed that compensatory amounts are lawful in view of the 
exceptional circumstances faced by the common agricultural policy. But the Court 
has nevertheless awakened all concerned to the fact that although monetary com-
pensatory amounts compensate for exchange-rate fluctuation, they also carry the 
risk of market fragmentation and trade disruption. At the same time it has also tried 
to curb the tendency to extend the coverage of monetary compensatory amounts to 
include certain derived products. 
Marketing of products 
When the import or export of a product is declared to the responsible authorities, 
the mere indication of the name of the product is not sufficient to identify it for the 
purpose of calculating the customs duty, the levy or the refund. The customs nom-
enclature meets this requirement. 
The Court has had to look into the marketing of a wide variety of products ranging 
from  the 'parson's nose' in the case of turkeys to farmyard poultry, from frozen 
caribou meat to brandied cherries or from crushed maize seeds to Thai meal derived 
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come before it, for  its verdict is  essential to ensuring uniform application of the 
Common Customs Tariff and of the levy and refund arrangements as well as to pre-
venting deflections of trade. 
Of course, fraudulent changes of description occur with certain products. Mayon-
naise is sometimes redesignated 'resolidified butter' for re-export purposes in order 
to obtain the appropriate refund. In the same way 'solid caramel' may turn out upon 
analysis to be made up largely of butter. One dealer engaged in exporting sausages 
from Germany to Yugoslavia applied for an export subsidy, but then analysis of the 
product revealed that the sausages consisted of fats and low-grade meat offals. Since 
the products no longer satisfied the Community definition of 'sausages', the applica-
tion for export subsidies had to be turned down. 
Common fisheries policy 
The establishment of a common fisheries  policy was  a source of much political 
controversy. The Member States, initially unable to establish a body of Community 
rules, have repeatedly taken unilateral measures. The Court has nevertheless made 
things plain. It has said loud and clear that since 1 January 1979, the end of the 
transitional period of the Act  of Accession  of Denmark, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom, the power to take measures for the conservation of fish stocks has lain ex-
clusively and permanently with the Community. Since that date the Member States 
have no longer been entitled to exercise their own authority in the matter of con-
servation in waters under their jurisdiction. The Council's failure to act did not re-
store this competence to the Member States, with carte blanche  to act unilaterally. 
The Court held that protection of the common interest required the Member States 
not only to consult the Commission and in good faith seek its approval, but also to 
refrain from laying down national conservation measures in the face of objections, 
reservations or conditions that the Commission might make. Moreover, the Com-
munity's fishermen  should be  allowed equal  access  to fishing  grounds under the 
jurisdiction of the Member States. 
Equality of  treatment of  Community citizens 
The objective of the Communities is not simply an economic one; of course national 
frontiers are to be abolished, but a form of human integration is also aimed at. As 
the preamble to the Treaty of Rome puts it, the Member States are 'determined to lay 
the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe' and have af-
firmed 'as the essential objective of their efforts the constant improvement of the liv-
ing and working conditions of their peoples'. The chapters on free movement of per-
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those seeking establishment on the principle of equal treatment for nationals of all 
Member States. Detailed rules for achieving this have been laid down in Council 
regulations and directives, although they have not always met the deadlines laid 
down by the Treaties. 
There is an abundance of Court of  Justice cases in matters relating to Community 
social law, more than in the competition field and nearly as many as in agriculture. 
There is a regular flow of cases from all the Member States. 
Italian workers are actually those who most frequently benefit from developments 
here, as they are far and away the largest class of plaintiff in cases referred to the 
Court. After all, Italy has provided the majority of Europe's migrant workers. 
Individual rights 
The Treaty of Rome entitles workers and members of their families to accept offers 
of employment actually made, to move freely within the territory of Member States 
for this purpose, to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in ac-
cordance with the provisions governing the employment of national workers and to 
remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed there. 
The Court has interpreted the principle of freedom of movement as conferring on 
workers individual rights which may be relied on against States and invoked before 
national courts.  It has  ensured uniform  application of the  Community rules  by 
eliminating both direct and indirect discrimination liable to affect foreign workers, 
not only at work, but also in ordinary family life. By giving the key concepts a Com-
munity definition,  the Court has removed the power to interpret them from  the 
hands of national authorities. 
The meaning of 'worker' 
One of the first points the Luxembourg judges had to clarify was the actual defini-
tion of a 'worker'. If  the Member States were to be left to decide unilaterally what 
was meant in the Treaty by the term 'worker' the concept might well lose all sub-
stance. 
The Court felt that a very broad definition was needed. In  a series of judgments it 
has therefore defined workers as those who, being nationals of a Member State, 
carry on activity as employed persons and benefit, under whatever description, from 
a national system of social security. It excludes self-employed persons, who benefit 
from freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services, but the term does 
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in a similar manner. It is not restricted to migrants or to travel in connection with a 
job. 
In another case the Court took the logic of the system so far as to find that the na-
tional authorities were no longer required, or even  entitled,  to grant permits to 
workers of other Member States who wished to enter their territories, as the worker 
was entitled to enter without prior authorization. Once allowed in, the person con-
cerned could not be  treated any differently from the national worker as  regards 
conditions of employment. 
National treatment for migrant workers 
The Court has not permitted any exception as regards conditions of employment. 
Thus it has recognized that migrant workers have the right to have their periods of 
military service taken into account for seniority purposes, the right to the special 
protection from dismissal provided for handicapped persons and in case of accidents 
at work, the right to separation allowances, the right to be affiliated to the national 
social security system despite working for the firm in a non-Member State, the right 
to training courses and occupational retraining free of charge where these benefits 
are available to nationals. 
In other case, particularly the Gravier case, the Court has gone even further, urging 
freedom  of access  to occupational  training  generally.  According  to  the  Court's 
reasoning, freedom  of movement permits people to obtain a  qualification in the 
Member State where they intend to carry on their activities and allows them the op-
portunity to complete their training and develop their talents in the Member State 
where the occupational training schemes include the appropriate specialization. The 
Court has  also  drawn the  conclusion  that the Member States  cannot impose  a 
charge, a registration fee  or a 'minerval' as a condition of access to courses of oc-
cupational training on students who are nationals of other Member States if such a 
charge is not imposed on national students. 
The Court has also held that the Community rules must prevail over the various na-
tional provisions concerning the calculation of social security benefits, which rival 
each other in complexity. In numerous rulings, it has endorsed the principle of ag-
gregation and apportionment. A retired person is entitled to his pension acquired in 
one Member State after he has taken up residence in another. A pension cannot be 
altered simply because the beneficiary resides  in the territory of a Member State 
other than the one where the institutional liable is situated. 
For the purpose of acquiring and retaining.a right to benefit, all periods of employ-
ment completed in the various Member States must be taken into account. When 
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benefit in a given Member State, that benefit must then be calculated by reference to 
the proportion which the period of employment in that State bears to the aggregate 
of the periods spent in employment. Migrant workers must also receive social as-
sistance guaranteeing a minimum subsistence level if a State grants this to its own 
citizens.  No condition regarding length  of residence  may be  imposed  if none is 
imposed on nationals of the Member State in question. 
Family protection 
The spouse and children of a migrant worker employed or self-employed on the ter-
ritory of a  Member State also have the right to settle  there and to take up any 
employment, even if they have the nationality of a non-member State. In the Court's 
view this privilege includes even the right of access to professions subject to a system 
of administrative authorization and specific professional rules, provided the person 
concerned has the professional qualifications and diplomas required by the legisla-
tion of the host Member State. Thus a Cypriot national, Emir Gul, husband of a 
British national working in the Federal Republic of Germany, was granted the right 
of access to the profession of medical specialist in Germany. 
In several judgments the Court has emphasized that the children of migrant workers 
must be admitted to courses of general education and occupational training. 
They are entitled to the same assitance as children of citizens of the State of res-
idence, such as interest-free loans, scholarships, advantages to assist the rehabilita-
tion of the handicapped, etc. The widow of a migrant worker, Anita Cristini, was 
held to be entitled to a  card entitling large families  to reduced railways fares,  a 
benefit previously reserved for French citizens. 
Restrictions and safeguards 
The only restrictions on freedom of movement are those justified on grounds of 
public policy, public security or public health. 
However, the Court has stated explicitly on several occasions that the justifications 
for restrictive measures on grounds of public policy, public security or public health 
must be considered in the light of Community rules, the principle of non-discrimina-
tion and proper legal safeguards. 
In one case the judges stressed that the right to enter another Member State and stay 
there was conferred directly on anyone covered by Community law, whether or not 
a residence permit was issued by the host country. The fact that such persons neglect 
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per se, a threat to public policy nor justify expulsion or temporary detention pend-
ing expulsion, though it may be subject to a penalty commensurate with the gravity 
of the offence. 
According to the Bonsignore case, any restriction on free movement must be based 
exclusively on the personal conduct of the person concerned, with no exclusions on 
the basis of whole categories. If  a threat to public policy is to be invoked, there must 
not only be that disturbance of the public peace that any violation of the law entails 
but  also  a  genuine  and  sufficiently  serious  threat  to  a  fundamental  interest  of 
society. 
According to the Adoui judgment a Member State cannot order expulsion by reason 
of behaviour which, when engaged in by its own nationals, does not lead to punitive 
measures or any other real  and effective measures designed  to combat such  be-
haviour. According to the Rutili case it is clear that membership of trade unions and 
the exercise of trade union rights cannot justify reliance on the exception for public 
policy. In the Royer Case it was held that when a residence permit is refused or can-
celled, or expulsion is  ordered, the interested party must, save in case of urgency 
duly established, be able to exhaust the available remedies on the same terms as na-
tionals. However, the Pecastaing case made it clear that where an expulsion order is 
made the person concerned does not have the right to remain in the Member State in 
question throughout the legal proceedings. 
Following the same approach, in the Mutsch case the judges in Luxembourg granted 
migrant workers the right to use their own language in  legal  proceedings on the 
same conditions as national workers. 
Employment in the public service 
Though Member States have a legitimate interest in  reserving posts in  the public 
service for their own nationals, this right is not unqualified. Ruling in a case where 
the Commission had brought proceedings against Belgium for failure to honour its 
obligations, the Court held that this reservation was confined to posts related to the 
exercise of power conferred by public law and duties designed to safeguard the gen-
eral interests of the State or of other public authorities. It accordingly decided that 
nationals of other Member States must be allowed access to the jobs, among others, 
of loader, driver, plate-layer,  shunter, handler, railway cleaner, carpenter, gard-
ener, electrician, plumber and hospital and children's nurse in municipal services. 
It expressly excluded the posts of technical office manager, general supervisor, su-
pervisor of public works, stocktaker, architect and nightwatchman. 
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Although the chapter on social provisions in the Treaty of Rome is rather vague, it 
does, nonetheless, contain one specific provision - the principle of equal pay for 
men and women, pay meaning the basic or minimum regular wage or salary and any 
other benefits paid directly or indirectly, in cash or in kind, by the employer. Since 
the Member States had not applied this principle, it was the Court which ultimately 
gave women their rights. A Belgian air hostess, Gabrielle Defrenne, had brought an 
action in a Belgian court for damages on the grounds that male and female air crew 
received  unequal pay.  In  a  ruling which  has  since  attracted great attention, the 
Court held that Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome did not simply lay down an ab-
stract principle but actually endowed those subject to it with rights which national 
courts were obliged to safeguard, without Community or national measures being 
needed to apply them. 
It stressed that it was the duty of these courts to ensure protection of the right to 
equal pay, notably in cases of discrimination directly resulting from legal provisions 
or collective agreements and in cases where men and women doing the same work in 
the same private or public undertaking or service are paid at different rates. Accord-
ing to the Court equal pay should have been fully guaranteed by the original Mem-
ber States with effect from January 1962-the beginning of the second stage of the 
transition period- and by the new Member States from January 1973, when the 
Act of Accession came into force. To avoid a flood of applications for retroactive 
compensation and the economic upheaval that this would entail, it ruled that, with 
the exception of cases commenced prior to the judgment, the direct effect of Article 
119 could be invoked only in cases of unequal treatment arising after the decision. 
Once this barrier had been lifted, other cases were not slow to follow, and the Court 
had plenty of opportunities to spell out the implications of that case. Thus, Member 
States are obliged to take effective steps to attain the objective of  equality and to en-
sure that the rights thus conferred can in fact be enforced before national courts. In 
the Smith case the Court stated that the principle of equal pay for equal work was 
not confined to situations in which men and women perform the same work for the 
same employer at the same time. It also applied in cases where a woman was known 
to be getting less pay than a man who had previously held the same job. 
The judges also stated in another case that the fact that part-time work was paid at a 
lower hourly rate than full-time work did not in itself constitute prohibited discri-
mination, if the rates were applied equally to men and women. By contrast, if it is 
established that a considerably smaller percentage of women than of men perform 
the minimum number of weekly working hours required in order to be able to claim 
the full-time hourly rate of pay, the inequality in pay will be contrary to Article 119 
of the Treaty where, regard being had to the difficulties encountered by women in 
arranging to work that minimum number of hours per week, the pay policy of the 
61 undertaking in  question cannot be explained by factors other than discrimination 
based on sex. 
Three German women had suffered discrimination in relation to access to employ-
ment.  Two of them, Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann, qualified social 
workers, had sought employment in a penal institution. The responsible authority 
refused to employ them on the ground of the problems and risks involved in the 
employment of female  candidates in institutions reserved for male prisoners. The 
other woman, Dorit Harz, a commercial engineer, was refused a post as manager on 
the ground that only men worked in marketing agricultural raw materials and that 
the religious and social structures of the Middle Eastern countries with which the 
employer had extensive commercial dealings excluded the possibility that a woman 
could conclude contracts there and maintain existing ones. 
The Court could not hold that they had a right to an employment contract, since 
such an obligation is  not covered by the Community directives. It did hold, how-
ever, that the women who had suffered discrimination were entitled to compensa-
tion commensurate with the loss they had suffered. Whilst the Court left it ot the 
Member States to choose what the sanction should be, it made it clear that the sanc-
tion should be such as to ensure an effective protection by the courts. It must also 
have a genuine deterrent effect on the employer. A purely symbolic compensation, 
for example repayment of the expenses involved in applying for the posts, was in 
any case insufficient. 
Measures based on the protection of public security do not justify any general re-
servation on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment. Exceptionally, 
however, in a situation where terrorist attacks are frequent, a Member State may re-
serve general police duties to men equipped with firearms.  In applying such a de-
rogation, it must in any event respect  the principle of proportionality, allocate du-
ties to women which can be carried out without firearms and examine periodically 
whether the derogation should be maintained. 
In the Roberts, Marshall and Beets cases the Court did not dispute the right of Mem-
ber States to fix  a different minimum retirement age for men and women. It did 
however make it clear that women cannot be  compelled to retire simply because 
they have reached the age at which they are entitled to a pension, where this is diffe-
rent for  men and women. Moreover, the voluntary severance grants paid by an 
employer to men and women wishing to leave their employment must be equivalent. 
Although statutory social security schemes do not fall within the provisions of Ar-
ticle 119, company pension schemes based on contract, supplementing the statutory 
social security benefits, do in the Court's view constitute an advantage paid by the 
. employer to the worker, and must therefore observe the principle of equality. That 
principle is infringed, according to the Weber case, when a firm excludes part-time 
62 employees from the company's pension scheme, if this measu're affects substantially 
more women than men, unless the measure can be explained by factors objectively 
justified and not involving any discrimination. 
On the other hand, a father, Ulrich Hofmann, failed in his attempt to obtain ma-
ternity leave. The Court held that the Community directives do not impose on the 
Member States the obligation to permit the alternative of granting such leave to the 
father, and are not intended to regulate the organization of the family or to modify 
the sharing out of responsibilities between the couple. 
Freedom to provide services 
It was the Court, too, which made a breakthrough as regards freedom to provide 
services and the right of establishment. This fundamental freedom covers the setting 
up of agencies, subsidiaries or branches, the formation and management of firms 
and companies, and the taking up and pursuit of self-employed activities. It, too, 
guarantees equal treatment with nationals.  Under the Treaty of Rome all restric-
tions  should have  been  abolished  by the end of the  transitional period, but the 
Council did not implement the programme imposed on it within the prescribed time-
limits. 
Reclutance to act here was overcome by a judgment given in clear and precise terms 
and from the mid-1970s quicker progress was made in implementing the Treaty. 
A legal adviser, Johannes van Bins bergen, who was an independent legal representa-
tive in the Netherlands, was  refused authorization to represent a client because he 
had transferred his residence to Belgium. When the case was referred to it the Court 
stated that restrictions on freedom to provide services should have been abolished at 
the end of the transitional period, which was the absolute time-limit for the entry 
into force of all the rules provided for by the Treaty; the provisions of the Treaty 
had become absolute by then. It ruled that, at least as far as the specific requirement 
of nationality or residence was concerned, the Treaty contained a definite obligation 
to attain a  specified result and that the Member States could not delay or com-
promise the attainment of that result simply through the absence of the necessary di-
rectives. The Court argued that the relevant articles have direct effect and may ac-
cordingly be invoked before national courts, at least in so far as they are designed to 
eliminate any discrimination against the person providing services on grounds of na-
tionality or of residence in a Member State other than the one in which the service is 
to be provided. Similarly, a Dutch insurance broker, Robert Coenen, having moved 
into Belgium, was allowed to continue his activities in his country of origin. The Bel-
gian firm Transporoute was granted the right to submit a tender for public works in 
the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg without having to have a registered office or an es-
tablishment there. 
63 But, depending on the particular nature of the services provided, the Court allows 
Member States to require any person providing services to comply in the general 
interest with objectively necessary occupational rules govering the organization of 
the profession and qualifications, ethics, supervision and liability, where those rules 
are incumbent on all persons established within the territory of the State where the 
services are being provided. Such rules must, however, be applied without discri-
mination. 
Removal  of restrictions on the freedom  of Member States' nationals to provide 
services means that the person providing the services may go to the Member State 
where the recipient of the services in established and that the recipent may go to the 
State where the person providing the services is established. These principles have 
been applied in an interesting way in the joined Luisi and Carbone cases as regards 
tourists, recipients of medical services and persons making journeys for study or 
business purposes, all these persons being recipients of services. 
The Court held that transfers of currency by way of remuneration for these services 
are payments and not movements of capital, even if they are effected by the physical 
transfer of banknotes. Member States can no longer, therefore, impose restrictions 
on these payments, except where the balance of payments is seriously endagered, in 
which case the necessary measures must be taken in accordance with the procedures 
provided by the EEC Treaty. 
Whilst the Member States are thus obliged to authorize payments in the currency of 
the Member States in which the creditor or the beneficiary resides, they nevertheless 
retain, by reason of their specific responsibilities for monetary questions, the power 
to verify whether transfers of currency ostensibly intended for payments that have 
been liberated are in reality being used for the purpose of speculative movements of 
capital. 
However, the Court emphasized that such checks must always respect the limits 
imposed  by  Community law and particularly those arising from  the freedom  to 
provide services  and the  freedom  of payments in  that connection.  They cannot 
therefore have the effect of limiting payments and transfers relating to the provision 
of services to a certain amount for each transaction or for a particular period, since 
in that case they would be a restriction on the freedoms granted by the Treaty. Nor 
may such checks, by the manner in which they are carried out, make these freedoms 
illusory or make their exercise subject to the discretion of the administration. 
The Member States may however impose fixed  limits within which  no check is 
carried out, and for expenditure beyond these limits require evidence of the genuine-
ness of the payment for provision of services. The limit must not however be fixed in 
such a way as to jeopardize the free movement of services. 
It is for the national court to determine in each case whether the checks on transfer 
of currency in the particular case before it do in fact respect these limits. 
64 Freedom of establishment 
The refusal to allow the Dutch lawyer Jean Reyners to engage in his profession in 
Belgium provided the Court with an ideal case with which to enforce the principle of 
freedom of establishment open to professional people, and at the same time to clar-
ify the exception to this freedom. The person in question was born in Belgium of 
Dutch parents, had studied in Belgium and had obtained the qualifications needed 
for access to the bar, but had retained his Dutch nationality. He was not allowed to 
register on the grounds that under Belgian law the profession was open only to Bel-
gian nationals. 
The Court stated that the rule requiring Member States to treat nationals of other 
Member States in the same way as their own nationals was one of the basic legal 
provisions of the Community. It stressed that as the rule referred to a series of legal 
provisions actually applied by the country of establishment to its own nationals it 
could by its very nature be invoked directly by nationals of all the Member States. 
The achievement of free movement before the end of the transitional period should 
have been facilitated, by, but was not conditional on, the implementation of a pro-
gramme of gradual measures.  Since the Council had failed  to take the necessary 
measures before the appointed time, the directives had become superfluous as re-
gards the implementation of the rule governing national treatment, since the latter 
was imposed- with direct effect- by the Treaty itself. 
At the same time the Court pointed out that, in accordance with the Treaty, restric-
tions on freedom of  establishment must be limited to those activities which, in them-
selves, involved direct and specific involvement in the exercise of official authority. 
According to the Court, in an occupation such as the legal profession, the activities 
of giving legal advice and assistance or representing and defending parties to court 
cases cannot be described in this way even though the performance of  these activities 
entails fulfilling obligations or exercising exclusive rights determined by law. 
The Court denied the French authorities the right, in their dealings with the Belgian 
lawyer Jan Theiffry and the British architect Richard Hugh Patrick, to rely on the 
absence  of a  Community directive,  since  the  freedom  of establishment  can  be 
achieved by applying national rules on recognition of professional qualifications in a 
manner in conformity with the Treaties. In other cases, on the other hand, it has re-
cognized that in  the absence of (or pending) harmonization a  State may require 
Community citizens to observe its national rules. 
Member States may not impose any penal  or administrative sanctions on a person 
who is exercising his profession without registration in the professional register, if 
such registration has been refused in infringement of Community law. 
Whilst recognizing the compatibility of professional bodies with Community law, 
the Court has nevertheless held that they have no right, by means of their internal 
65 professional rules, to impair the freedoms conferred by the Treaty. By virtue of  these 
principles the Austrian veterinary surgeon Vincent Auer, a naturalized Frenchman 
with an Italian qualification, was finally able to exercise his profession after having 
fought for 25 years before professional bodies and the courts. The German lawyer 
Onno Klopp, a member of a firm of lawyers in Dusseldorf, sought admission to the 
Paris Bar. He stated that he nevertheless wished to remain a member of the Dussel-
dorf Bar and to keep his residence and chambers in that city. The Paris Bar Council 
Formal hearing of  the Court of  Justice of the European Communities 
rejected his request on the ground that an avocat, even if he satisfies all personal re-
quirements, could have only one professional domicile, which must be within the 
jurisdiction of the court in which he practises. The Court of  Justice rejected this con-
tention. It made it clear that the legislation of a Member State cannot require that a 
lawyer should have only one establishment in the whole of Community territory. 
Such a restriction, it pointed out, would have the consequence that once established 
in  a specific Member State the lawyer could no longer rely on the freedoms laid 
down by the Treaty in order to establish himself in another Member State, except at 
the price of abandoning his existing establishment. 
66 In a similar case the Court struck down a rule requiring doctors to have their names 
removed from the register in  one Member State before they could practise in  an-
other. Such restrictions are compatible with the Treaty only if they are in fact jus-
tified by general obligations inherent in the proper exercise of the profession. 
The Court's judgments have thus made a vital contribution to social integration by 
ensuring that the principle of  equal trreatment has direct effect not only in the acts of 
governments authorities but also in collective agreements, for they have placed a 
strict interpretation upon the public policy exception, submitted restrictions to the 
principle of proportionality and confirmed the protection given to the fundamental 
rights of the individual. 
67 VI - The Community's achievements 
But what view  do those  who work in  the courtroom have  of the  Community? 
Robert Lecourt, former President of the Court of Justice,  has observed  that the 
Community is  a Community based on law.  The authority of Community law is 
beyond doubt since Community law is binding. But Community law is law with a 
specific objective. The end is the living force behind the law. The law created the 
common market and is now its guardian. Furthermore, the law is there to protect in-
dividuals in a multinational entity. Finally, it is the means of  legal integration, the ef-
fects  of which are filtering through gradually to the innermost core of daily life. 
Consequently, the basic characteristics of Community law-its authority, direct ef-
fect,  uniformity, primacy and irreversibility -constitute the binding force which 
holds the Community together. 
With the Council, the Commission and Parliament, the Court has thus built up over 
the years  an  impressive  range of achievements,  comprising not only the specific 
points that have been settled, but a whole complex of permanent and fundamental 
elements, essential for the cohesion and the very existence of the Community, and 
no longer open to challenge. 
Whilst the future development of  the Community depends essentially on the will and 
dynamism of the political institutions, the Court will continue in the future also to 
make its own unique contribution, acting - in  the words of the famours  judge 
Pierre Pescatore- 'both as a guarantor of what exists already and as a catalyst of 
new developments', 
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Increase in the Court's workload 
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D  Direct actions (including staff cases): 
D  Preliminary questions (referred by national courts): 
I  :>,1111  Judgments given by the Court: 
3 727  (•) 1979 
1444 
2094 
-56 direct  actions  and  1 116  staff 
cases, of which 1 112 cases belonged 
to 10 groups of connected cases. 72 
TADLE 1 
Cases brought since 1953 analysed by subject-matter• 
Situation at 31 December 1985 
(the Court of Justice took up its duties under the ECSC Treaty in 1953 and under 
the EEC and EAEC Treaties in 1958) 
Direct actions 
ECSC  EEC 
Right 
Free  of  Social 
Type of case  move·  estah- secu-
mcnt  !ish- rity 
Scrap  Com- of  mcnt,  Com- and  Agri-
cqua- Tran~- pet- Other2  good-;  free- Tax  pet·  free  cui- Other 
liza- port  it ion  and  dom  cases  it ion  move- tural 
tion  CU'>- to  mcnt  policy 
om"  supply  of 
union  scr- work-
vices  crs 
Cases brought  167  35  27  239  134  35  52  195  11  250  416 
Cases not resulting in 
a judgment  25  6  10  83  43  11  8  15  4  31  89 
Cases decided  142  29  17  122  65  6  30  157  5  176  187 
Cases pending  - - - 34  26  18  14  23  2  43  140 
EAr 
11 
I 
3 
7 
1 Ca.;;c>i concerning several suhjcct'i are clas.;;ificd under the most important heading. 
2 Levies, invc'itmcnt declarations, tax charges, miners.' Ponuscs. 
3 Convention of 27 Scptcmhcr 1908 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcc:rncnt of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (the 'Bru.;;scls Convcntinn'). Requests for preliminary ruling" 
Cases 
con- Right  Social 
ccrning  Free  of  secu-
Com- move- estah- rity 
munity  mcnt  lbh- and  Con- Privi-
staff  of  ment,  Com- fre-edom  Agri- vcn- kges 
law  good'i  free- Tax  pet·  of  cui- Trans- lions,  and  Other  Total 
and  dom  CJ'iC.'i  ilion  nuwc- rural  port  Article  immu-
CU'i- to  mcnt  policy  210
1  nitics 
toms  supply  of 
union  scr- work-
vices  ... 
2155  341  40  88  61  265  410  29  55  9  146  5 171 
1120  18  1  2  5  16  20  4  3  1  7  1 523 
698  294  32  58  53  220  359  20  48  7  110  2 838 
337  29  7  28  3  29  31  5  4  1  29  810 
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TABLE 2 
Cases brought since 1958 anal~·sed by type (EEC Treaty)
1 
. 
Situation at 31 December 1985 
(the Court of  Justice took up its duties under the EEC Treaty in 1958) 
Proceedings brought under 
Article 173  Article 177 
Type ofcao;e  Arts  Art.  Art.  By 
169  170  171  By  By  Com- Art. 175  Inter·  Art. 
and  govern·  indhi·  munity  Total  Validity  preta- Total  IRI 
93  ments  duals  institu- tion 
tions 
Case brought  412  2  13  81  8  361  450  30  202  1180  1382  9 
Cases not resulting in a judgment  114  1  3  9  3  42  54  5  5  69  74  3 
Case decided  165  1  3  39  5  253  297  24  175  97I  1146  3 
In favo~r of applicane  149  1  3  13  2  70  85  3  - - - 3 
Dismissed on the substance'  15  - 25  3  I25  I 53  3  - - - -
Dismissed as inadmissible  I  - - 1  - 58  59  IS  - - - -
Cases pending  133  - 7  33  - 66  99  1  22  I40  162  3 
1 Excluding proceedings by staff and cases concerning the interpretation ofthe Protocol on Privileges and Immunities and of  the Staff Regulations. (See Table 1 for these). 
2 Totals may be smaller than the sum of in"dividual itemS because some cases are based ofi more than one Treaty anicle. 
3 In respect of at least one of the applicant's main claims.  · 
4 This also ~vers  proceedingsTcjected partly as inadmissible and partly on the substance. 
Proto-. 
cols. 
Comren~  Grand 
Art.  tions.  total~ 
215  Art. 
220 
206  55  2 559 
29  3  286 
152  48  I 839 
12  - 256 
124  - 295 
16  - 94 
25  4  434 -..! 
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TABLE3 
Cases brought since 1953 under the ECSC Treaty
1 and since 1958 under the EAEC Treaty
1 
Situation at 31 December 1985 
(the Court of  Justice 'took up its duties under the ECSCTreaty in 1953 and under the EAEC Treaty in 1958) 
Numher of proceedings instituted 
By Community  Bv indi\'iduals  Art.41  Type of  case  By governments  institutions  (u.rrdertakings)  ECSC 
ECSC I  EAEC  ECSC I  EAEC  ECSC I  EAEC  Questions of 
validity 
Cas.es brought  25  - - 1  442  8  4 
Cases not resulting in a judgment  9  - - - 115  - -
Cases decided  15  - - 1  294  1  4 
In favour of applicant
2  6  - - I  62  I  -
Dismissed on the substance
3  9  - - - I74  - -
Dismissed as inadmissible  - - - - 58  - -
Cases pending  1  - - - 33  7  -
- -- - ----- --- -- - -- -- - ---- -- - -
1 Excluding prOceedingll hy staff and ca,.es concerning the interpretation of the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities and of the Staff Regulations. 
2 In respect of at least one of the applicant's main claims. 
3 This also co\'ers proceedings rejected partly as inadmissible and panty on the !iubstance. 
Art. 150  Art. 153 
EAEC  EAEC 
Questions of 
interpretation 
3  2 
- 1 
3  1 
- -
- 1 
- -
- -
L_  __  -
Total 
ECSC I  EAEC 
471  14 
124  1 
313  6 
68  2 
I83  1 
58  -
34  7 
- - -- -Direct actions brought by:  1953-85 
Belgium  6 
Denmark  3 
Germany  21 
Greece  1 
France  16 
Ireland  6 
Italy  28 
Luxembourg  4 
Netherlands  15 
United Kingdom  9 
Total brought by Member States:  109 
Commission  435 
Council  2 
European Parliament  1 
Individuals or firms  1 025. 
Total:  1 572 
76 Direct actions brought  against:  1953-85 
Belgium  71 
Denmark  11 
Germany  33 
Greece  16 
France  76 
Ireland  22 
Italy  140 
Luxembourg  20 
Netherlands  20 
United Kingdom  21 
Total brought against Member States:  430 
Commission  964 
Council  71 
Commission and Council  93 
European Parliament  9 
Individuals or  firms  4 
Total:  1 572 
77 Subject-matter of  direct actions 
1. EEC 
78 
Discriminations (Article 7) 
Free movement of  goods (Articles 9-11) 
Customs duties (Articles 12-17) 
Common customs tariff  (Articles 18-29) 
Quantitative restrictions (Articles 30-35) 
Commercial and industrial property (Article 36) 
National monopolies (Articles 37) 
Agricultural market (Articles 38-47) 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) 
Free movement of  workers (Article 48) 
Social security for migrant workers (Article 51) 
Right of  establishment (Articles 52-58) 
Freedom to provide services (Articles 59-60) 
Free movement of  capital (Articles 67-73) 
Transport (Articles 7 4-84) 
Restrictive practices, dominant positions (Articles 85-90) 
Dumping (Article 91) 
State aids (Articles 92-94) 
Internal taxation (Articles 95-99) 
Approximation oflaws (Articles 100-102) 
Conjunctural policy (Article 103) 
Commercial policy (Articles 11 0-116) 
Social policy (Articles 117-122) 
1961-85 
1 
22 
26 
6 
78 
6 
3 
266 
29 
6 
6 
29 
17 
1 
16 
198 
29 
51 
54 
139 
5 
23 
6 Subject matter of direct actions (continued) 
European Social Fund (Articles 123 -128) 
Compliance with Court judgments (Article 171) 
Procedural questions (Article 177) 
Arbitration clauses (Article 181) 
Financial contribution by Member  States (Article 209) 
N on-contractualliabil  ity (Article 215) 
Safeguard measures (Article 226) 
Staff law 
Functioning of  the Communities 
Community competence 
Accession of  the Hellenic Republic 
Accession of  Spain and Portugal 
Lome Conventions 
EEC/third country association agreements 
2. EAEC 
Supply(Articles 52-76) 
Arbitration clause (Article 153) 
Staff of  the joint undertakings (Articles 146 and 18 8) 
1961-85 
4 
13 
1 
7 
3 
178 
29 
7 
22 
2 
6 
4 
1 
1 
4 
7 
79 Subject matter of  direct actions 
3. ECSC 
Coal market 
Control by the High Authority 
Quantitative restrictions (Article 4(a)) 
State aids (Article 4( c)) 
Consultative Committee (Article 18) 
Non-contractual liability (Article 40) 
Verifications (Article 47) 
Levies (Articles 49-50) 
Scrap equalization {Article 53) 
Investments {Article 54) 
Quota system (Article 58) 
Prices {Articles 60-64) 
Restrictive practices and concentrations (Articles 65-66) 
Transport (Article 70) 
Commercial policy {Article 71-7  5) 
Supply 
Functioning of  the Communities 
4. Privileges and immunities 
5. Stafflaw 
80 
1953-85 
15 
2 
1 
10 
1 
64 
8 
8 
167 
3 
145 
42 
27 
35 
1 
2 
22 
7 
2 155 ~lemher  State  1961 
Belgium  - - - - - - 5 
Denmark  - - - - - - -
FR of Germany  - - - - 4  - 11 
Greece  - - - - - - -
France  - - - - 2  - 3 
Ireland  - - - - - - -
Italy  - - - 2  - - -
Luxembourg  - - 1  - - - 1 
Netherlands  I  5  5  4  1  1  3 
United Kingdom  - - - - - - -
Total  1  5  6  6  7  1  23 
00 
Source of requests for preliminary rulings 
(Situation at 31 December 1985) 
1  4  4  1  5  8  5  7  ll 
- - - - - - - 1  -
4  11  21  18  20  37  15  26  28 
- - - - - - - - -
1  1  2  6  1  4  6  15  8 
- - - - - - - - 1 
1  - 2  5  4  5  5  14  12 
- 1  - 1  - I  - 1  -
2  - 3  6  lO  6  7  4  14 
- - - - - - 1  1  1 
9  17  32  37  40  61  39  69  75 
Total 
16  7  l3  14  12  lO  9  l3  l3  158 
1  3  1  2  1  1  4  2  - 16 
30  46  33  24  41  36  36  38  40  519 
- - - - - - - - - 0 
14  12  18  14  17  39  15  34  45  257 
2  1  2  3  - - 2  I  2  14 
7  11  19  19  12  18  7  10  11  164 
- - 1  - 4  - - - 6  17 
9  38  11  17  17  21  19  22  14  240 
5  5  8  6  5  4  6  9  8  59 
84  123  106  99  109  129  98  129  139  1 444 Courts making references for preliminary rulings 
Total 
1961 to 
1985 
Belgium 
- Cour de Cassation  25 
- Conseil d'Etat  6 
Other courts  127 
Total:  158 
Denmark 
- llojesteret  3 
Other courts  13 
Total:  16 
Germany 
- Bundcsverfassungsgericht  0 
- Bundesgerichtshof  26 
- Dundesarbcitsgericht  4 
- Bundcsverwaltungsgericht  15 
- Dundcsfinanzhof  81 
- Dundessozialgericht  25 
Other courts  368 
Total:  519 
Greece 
- Arios Pagos  0 
- Simvoulio tis Epikratias  0 
Other courts  0 
Total:  0 
France 
- Cour de Cassation  29 
- Conseil d'Etat  7 
Other courts  221 
Total:  257 
Ireland 
-An Chuirt Uachtarach  0 
-An Ard-Chuirt  9 
-An Chuirt Chuarda  1 
-An Chuirt Duiche  1 
Other courts  3 
Total:  14 
82 Italy 
- Corte costituzionale  0 
-Corte suprema di Cassazione  33 
- Consiglio di Stato  0 
Other courts  131 
Total:  164 
Luxembour~: 
- Cour superieure de justice  6 
- Conscil d'Etat  5 
Other courts  6 
Total:  17 
Netherlands 
- Raad van State  6 
- Hoge Raad  31 
- Centrale Raad van Berocp  27 
-College van Berocp voor hct Bedrijfs!even  59 
- Taricfcommissic  16 
Other courts  101 
Total:  240 
United Kin~:dom 
-House of Lords  5 
- Privy Council  0 
- Court of Appeal  5 
-Inner House of Court of Session  0 
-Court of Appeal of N. Ireland  0 
Other courts  49 
Total:  59 
83 Subject-matter references for preliminary rulings 
1. EEC 
84 
Discriminations (Article 7) 
Free movement of  goods (Articles 9-11) 
Customs duties (Articles 12-17) 
Common customs tariff  {Articles 18-29) 
Quantitative restrictions (Articles 30-35) 
Comercial and industrial property {Article 36) 
National monopolies (Article 37) 
Agricultural market (Articles 38-47) 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (Article 40) 
Free movement of  workers (Article 48) 
Social security for migrant workers {Article 51) 
Right of  establishment {Articles 52-58) 
Freedom to provide services (Articles 59-60) 
Free movement of  capital {Articles 67-73) 
Transport (Articles 74-84) 
Restrictive practices, dominant positions (Articles 85-90) 
State aids (Articles 92-94) 
Internal taxation (Articles 95-98) 
Value-added tax (Article 99) 
Approximation oflaws (A!1icles 100-1 02) 
Conjunctural policy (Article 103) 
Balance of payments (Articles 104-1 09) 
Commercial policy (Articles 110-116) 
Social policy (Articles 117-122) 
1961-85 
5 
38 
96 
116 
119 
28 
16 
507 
4 
53 
211 
24 
19 
4 
29 
68 
16 
60 
37 
51 
4 
4 
16 
5 Subject-matter references for preliminary rulings (continued) 
Equal pay (Article 119) 
Procedural questions (Article 177) 
Non-contractualliablity (Article 215) 
Application of  Article 220 
Safeguard measures (Article 226) 
Equal treatment of  men and women (Article 235) 
Functioning of  the Communities 
Stafflaw 
Accession of  the Hellenic Republic 
EEC/  AASM Association 
EEC/third country association agreements 
Judgments Convention (27. 9. 1986) 
Lome Convention 
Privileges and immunities 
2. EAEC (Article 150) 
Privileges and immunities 
Procedural questions (Article 152) 
Non-contractual liability (Article 188) 
3. ECSC(Artide41) 
Levies (Article 49) 
Coal market 
Prices (Articles 60-64) 
Dumping 
1961-85 
6 
17 
2 
1 
7 
17 
9 
5 
1 
3 
14 
55 
2 
9 
1 
1 
1 
1953-85 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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